The Town of Seabrook has completed, and the Board of Selectmen approved, the 2023 Emergency Operations Plan. This plan is updated every five years and follows our 2018 update. My thanks to Emergency Management Director Joseph Titone, Emergency Management Secretary Kelly McDonald, and Fire Chief William Edwards for all of their work on this project. The plan is attached below.
Stephen Ambrose has given us a three volume biography of Richard M. Nixon, the 37th President of the United States, and the first President to resign from office. This was the first of the three volumes. The book goes back to 1987 and so necessarily misses much information that has come out since then. This first volume is likely less impacted by that issue.
Richard Nixon most certainly has to be one of the most psychoanalyzed of American Presidents. For such a successful politician he would not be considered to be comfortable around people, and some of his personal traits would become the subject of so much writing and discussion. On that basis alone the part of the book dealing with his upbringing and development is more important, and more interesting, than the typical biography.
The Nixon that developed into a U.S. Representative, and Senator, is covered, and it is safe to say that Nixon became a national figure through those campaigns. He began to draw not only attention, but the enmity of Democrats nationwide for how he campaigned. Those campaigns alone could, and have, filled books. As Nixon became a national figure the Republican Party faced some of the same fissures that are being debated in that party today. Nixon was always interested primarily in foreign policy and over the course of his career came to be known as a GOP expert on the world. After WWII the GOP isolationist wing, as it had before the war, started to become predominant in the party. One of the first flash points in the GOP debate was over the Marshall Plan, and support of the Truman desire to send aid to Greece and Turkey as the British retrenched. Nixon received a letter opposing the Marshall Plan from a group of original supporters, but he determined, on his own, to support the Plan. Nixon the internationalist was born.
“These were not just the voices of California reactionaries; the Republican Party as a whole was having trouble swallowing the Marshall Plan. Senator Taft proclaimed that American money should not be poured into a ‘European TVA.’ Like many Republicans, Taft was disturbed at postwar steps in Western Europe to achieve democratic socialism, and he feared that the Europeans would use Marshall Plan money to nationalize basic industries, including American-owned plants. But despite the pressure from his constituents and from his party leaders, Nixon made up his own mind on the basis of what he saw, and learned, showed that he could free himself from Republican dogma, and then, to top it off, convinced his constituents that he was right.”
Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 155
The book presents us with some fascinating material, with some real historical perspective added to key parts of U.S. history. The Domino theory in Indochina? Nixon was propagating it in 1954. His role, from the inside as Vice-President, and from the outside after his defeat in the 1960 Presidential election, was so very impactful on U.S. policy, as he always advocated a tougher line against the North Vietnamese. Both Kennedy, and more importantly LBJ, were impacted by Nixon, and the harder edge of the GOP, in formulating policy in Vietnam. The “who lost China” theme always was useful politically and he used it ruthlessly.
“ ‘To sum it up bluntly,’ he declared, ‘the Acheson policy was directly responsible for the loss of China. And if China had not been lost, there would have been no war in Korea and there would be no war in Indochina today.’”
Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 349
Nixon was clearly wrong on this matter but the politics of it were more important to him. And in fairness at that time it was just not clear that this idea was wrong.
Nixon’s interactions, and political balancing of, the Joseph McCarthy issue is covered, and it shows Nixon as handling the issue adroitly as far as the politics went, but of course such political handling avoided condemnation of the indefensible. Even Ike, who detested much of what Joe McCarthy said and did, walked a fine line.
Nixon, as the Vice President under Ike, was a loyal servant to the President. He did not always agree with Ike, and in his memoirs spoke forcefully against the Eisenhower action to force France, Britain, and Israel to abandon their seizure of the Suez Canal. (He supported the President at the time) We get to look at the events leading up to the “Checkers speech” Nixon gave that saved his spot on the 1952 Republican ticket, which likely saved his career.
There is plenty to look at through Nixon’s 8 years as Ike’s VP. Nixon’s credentials as an ardent anti-communist were burnished during this tenure despite Ike. In light of later developments his position on “Red China” was fascinating. With an absence from an upcoming NSC meeting coming Nixon sent a memo on the China issue so that his views would be known.
“I wish to have my view put on the record as follows: I am unequivocally opposed at this time to recognition of Red China, admission of Red China to the United Nations and to any concept of ‘two Chinas’”.
Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 460
Nixon’s “kitchen debate” with Khrushchev garnered him much publicity, and of course made him a champion of the anti-communist right. Nixon’s very hard anti-communism always gave him a bit of leeway domestically, which he would exploit carefully. Nobody could accuse Nixon of being “soft” if he made a domestic concession or two. His anti-communist bona fides were just too strong.
The book, of course, gives us a look at one of the most fascinating Presidential elections in history, the Nixon-JFK match of 1960. Great look at how that campaign took shape, and how Nixon was out-maneuvered by the Kennedy campaign on the issue of national security. (The Missile Gap) Nixon never forgot that lesson, and that campaign hardened him more than a little bit. (If that was possible.) Ambrose takes this book through the Nixon campaign for Governor of California. That campaign loss, to Edmund (Pat) Brown, the father of Jerry Brown, brought Nixon to the nadir of his political career. A two-time loser after his loss to JFK in 1960 Nixon was written off as politically dead by many. His press conference after that loss (you won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore) gave credence to the idea he was finished. We know that his political story did not end there, but that is where this first volume comes to a close.
Ambrose, admittedly, was not a Nixon fan, but he takes great pains to be even-handed in his approach. He offers both criticism and praise, and I do believe the book is fair.
A final note on this is that we see some of the very important people that would later be associated with Nixon start to appear. Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and even Judge John Sirica make appearances in the book.
There is a lot of scholarship on Nixon, and though dated I do believe that the Ambrose book is well worth the read. Nixon remains one of the most polarizing of U.S. Presidents, and one of the true giants of American politics. Understanding his life, times, and politics, I believe, will help us to understand some of the many issues facing the country today.
As i continue to be drawn to books about the Administration of Richard Nixon, the 37th President of the United States I thought he might be a good subject for a blog post independent of the books. The sheer volume of the writing is staggering and brings to us the fact that Nixon was much more than the great political villain some easy history paints him as today. Some of the books that I have read, with some reviewed, are:
Master of the Game (Kissinger’s Middle East Diplomacy.)
Three Days at Camp David (Nixon’s move to take the dollar off the gold standard)
The Nixon Defense (John Dean on Watergate)
Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (The Nixon opening to China)
The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (Part of Rick Perlstein’s great multi-book series on the rise of the right)
White House Years (The first of the three volumes of Kissinger’s Memoirs)
The Making of the President 1960 (Teddy White’s first run at a campaign book. It set the standard for much that followed.)
Nixonland The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. (Another from Perlstein)
American Maelstrom The 1968 Election and the Politics of Division (Superb effort by Michael Cohen)
All The Presidents Men (Woodward Bernstein)
The Last Days (Woodward Bernstein)
Nixon The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 (Part 1 of 3 from Steve Ambrose)
Nixon’s presidential administration has, without question, left plenty to write about., as has his full career. Much of that legacy is tarnished, and not only by Watergate. A fair look at the totality of the record shows us that whatever your view of Nixon he ranks as one of the largest American figures of the 20th century. LBJ has had a similar volume of material written, and stands with Nixon as one of the most impactful Americans of the 20th century. (We eagerly await the final volume on LBJ from Robert Caro, but I digress.)
An amazing Nixon fact is that he was on every national Republican ticket, except for 1964, for 20 years. (1952, 1956, 1960, 1968, and 1972) In 1964, despite not being on the ticket, he was still a major player in the process. A dominant player in the GOP, and nationally. Hard to see anyone ever replicating that.
Nixon was also a U.S. Congressman and Senator, and from those perches managed to have an outsized impact on U.S. foreign policy. This influence was both partisan and influential, as Democratic Administrations (Truman, Kennedy, LBJ) always had to be mindful of Nixon’s attacks from the right. He managed to get these folks looking over their shoulders, concerned about the potential criticism. (Who lost China?) In my view it is one of the most important aspects of Nixon’s career. Even out of office he had some measure of influence and an ability to get Democratic Presidents unnerved.
Nixon, of course, is very much linked to Watergate. As time marches on and memories fade he likely will be known more for that than anything. His actions with regard to Watergate were an abomination, for the country, and for Nixon personally. Despite that legacy he managed to partially rehabilitate himself in the years after his resignation, There have been some recent news stories about newly released correspondence from President Nixon to then President Bill Clinton. A link to the WSJ story is below. Nixon, at 81, provided to Clinton some sage advice, and though the story was just getting started, some incredibly prescient observations/advice on Russia, and Ukraine.
Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”
“The Ukraine War Would Not Have Surprised Richard Nixon” Luke A. Nichter Wall Street Journal July 21, 2023
Bill Clinton, in giving the eulogy at the Nixon funeral, said that Nixon needed to be judged for the totality of his career, and not just on one part of it. While the totality, besides Watergate, was not always positive there were indeed some remarkable moments and achievements.
The books by Perlstein referenced above, and the American Maelstrom book by Cohen, are not kind to Nixon. They do show what a major impact his career had on American politics, and how that influence is still felt today.
Nixon was never considered to be a man with a great sense of humor, but even he got into the Rowan & Martin Laugh In craze that swept the country during his second campaign for the Presidency in 1968. His brief but memorable appearance on Laugh In was a big success for him. I think he delivered the line perfectly. His letter to President Clinton, referenced above, is below. The Clinton eulogy for Nixon is below. More on Nixon to come.
I have presented the 2024 Seabrook Capital Improvement Plan to the Board of Selectmen as well as the Planning Board. The CIP document is one of critical importance in every community. With aging wastewater infrastructure and the need to identify new water sources it is especially important for Seabrook in 2024.
I have been intrigued by recent writing (and podcasting) by Ezra Klein on the lack of effectiveness in government, and how we “need a liberalism that builds.” In reading and listening to Klein I was struck by how powerful his arguments were, and how much of his writing on the subject was and is recognizable. I wrote a blog piece on it, and Klein has resumed this conversation through his New York Times column. In listening to the Klein podcast I listened to Klein interview Jennifer Pahlka, the author of a new book “[Re] Coding America.” Klein described the book as one that he hoped that “all policymakers would read.” He hooked me, and after reading it I agree. This is a book that policy makers should read.
Pahlka has served as the Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the United States, and is the founder of Code for America, a non-profit that assists government in formulating workable technology solutions.
Pahlka, in writing this book, really does not pull many punches. She gives us examples of notable government technology failures, and talks about, in great specificity, why these failures occurred. In identifying the failures and why these failures occurred Pahlka, in my view, manages to get well beyond technology issues to fundamental issues of management, and how we make policy. While this book is centered on technology the management lessons imparted extend well beyond technology issues. I do believe that the obvious connection Klein makes to his policy complaints from the “We Need a Liberalism That Builds” series of writings and podcasts are indeed reflected in this book. And they are unquestionably valid.
The book is not a long one, but there is just so much to unpack. We get a view of some pretty notable tech failures in government (including the health care.gov debacle) that examine the failure, and the root causes of the failure. These root causes are not because of faulty code, or due to projects being under-resourced. Pahlka identifies systemic incentives that have ground level policy implementers more concerned with checking off boxes dictated by by the policy at hand, and protecting themselves against oversight, and potential project failure that someone above them may attribute to implementation that deviated from policy. And that oversight can be extensive, as Pahlka points out.
“But it’s already common for government technology teams to report to six, seven, eight, or even more separate oversight bodies, and that’s before they get flagged for an investigation by an agency inspector general, audited by the Government Accountability Office, or called before a congressional committee (or the state or local equivalent of any of these). There are obvious harms from this excess: it worsens an already debilitatingly risk aversion, and when these bodies issue conflicting guidance it creates confusion and derails progress. But the bigger problem is that all the oversight hijacks the time and attention the teams supposedly delivering the product or service. When all your time is spent answering questions and writing reports for other people inside government, it’s mighty hard to be focused on the people outside government you’re supposed to serve.”
Jennifer Pahlka “[Re] Coding America.” Pg. 14
An important point but one that flows into a more critical one, which is the total disconnect between those creating policy, and the folks on the ground trying to implement said policy. That disconnect is shown to us through several painful specifics.
We get a look at the overloaded California unemployment benefits agency, whose software staggered and crashed under the load of filings during the pandemic. Whenever I would see a story like that I always assumed that the underlying technology was likely ok, but that the system was simply over-capacity. Wrong again. Pahlka describes what they found under the hood, which was a system that had been appended to multiple times, and in multiple ways, building on top of technology that dates back to the 1980’s that was using COBOL. The system was so disjointed, with these separate pieces handling different tasks, (and sometimes the same tasks) that the team brought in to ascertain the backlog of cases took seven full weeks just to count that number. This was not employee incompetence, or even the IT staff being incompetent. It was operating a legacy system that had continually been patched with updates that built on obsolete technology that simply could not meet the needs of the citizens it was supposed to be helping.
Well then why not exit the existing system and start from scratch? Pahlka gives us the simply unbelievable cases of where we have set out to do that.
1. The California update of the court system software to connect the courts with a document management system. Cost $500 million. Result: Scrapped. 2. A 2009 launch of new software by the U.S. State Department to upgrade software for visas, passport renewals, and other services. Estimated launch 2016. Cost: Original estimate of $18 million. Real cost: Indeterminate, with estimates between $200-600 million. Launch? Limited pilot of one component in 2019 in six locations worldwide. As of 2021 that pilot program had not been expanded. 3. IRS project to replace the key “Individual Master File” launched in 2000, with completion scheduled for 2006. By 2009 project $37 million over budget, with no result. Project: Scrapped. New replacement project launched, scheduled completion by 2014. In 2019 that project was declared too broad by the IRS, and modified to retire only parts of the old system. In 2021 the IRS has said anticipated completion of the new project is 2030.
Why does this occur? Is it lack of technology chops in government service? Pahlka points out that many of the mega projects have been outsourced to companies with plenty of technology talent, but the results have been, in many instances, the same. Plenty of money spent, but no real results. Nicholas Bagley, in an Atlantic story on this book, summed it up accurately (and better than I could)
“Pahlka brings to vivid life how a cover-your-butt culture that prizes legalistic compliance above all else is especially pernicious for government tech. Policy makers layer requirement upon requirement without considering whether the benefits of complexity outweigh the costs. Even when policy makers give agencies some flexibility, the bureaucracy often transforms suggestions into rigid requirements, which are then slavishly followed. The public interest gets forgotten along the way. In other words, Pahlka’s book isn’t just about tech. It’s about the American administrative state, and it’s a call for paring back the rigid rules that make it so hard to govern, and for rebuilding government’s ability to do its job effectively.”
Nicholas Bagley How to Fix the Government The Atlantic June 12, 2023
Creating top down specifications for new software that include what browsers need to be accommodated, and other layers of rules that are meant to meet needs but simply hamper the development of technology that actually helps people, is a recipe for failure. And once these conditions are placed the bureaucracy, in so many cases just fearful of not checking all the boxes, carries them out even to the detriment of the ultimate usability of the software.
As Bagley points out Pahlka’s book is nominally about government and technology, but in reality it is about so much more. Policy makers really should read this book. It not only will open your eyes but gives concrete, and achievable, ways to defeat this problem. If you have time catch the Ezra Klein podcast with her as the guest. Worth a listen.
Author Robert Kagan has given us an extraordinary book that looks at U.S. foreign policy from 1898 to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This book does not simply offer broad strokes but gets into the key aspects of decision making during this period.
Kagan is a State Department veteran and the author of “Dangerous Nation” which I have not read. This book follows “Dangerous Nation as the second in a trilogy. Some have classified him as a “neo-con” but at this point maybe those attempts to file individuals into defined categories is not as useful as it might have been once.
The United States of the early 20th century was indeed developing into an economic colossus but without the desire to play a large role in international affairs. The country, and its leaders, expressed a high level of disdain and distrust for such affairs, and were very reluctant to get intertwined in the rivalries and great power maneuvering of Europe. Kagan takes us through this period, leading up to the U.S. entry into World War I, with great detail. We get a real view of public opinion, and the political currents running through this question in the U.S. That opinion, right up until the U.S. entry into the War, always had a sizable segment favoring no involvement. The book is worth reading just for the detailed description of the tortured road Woodrow Wilson took from neutrality to American entry into WW I, and how some key public opinion changed over the course of the first three years of the war. Was there something more at stake than anger over German actions?
“Walter Lippmann spelled out these broader interests in the New Republic in the weeks following Germany’s January 30 announcement. He argued that the United States had an interest not in legalisms about neutral rights but in the preservation of an ‘Atlantic Community’ made up of the western and mostly democratic nations on both sides of the ocean. It had an interest in seeing to it that ‘the world’s highway’ should not be closed either to Americans or the Western Allies. It had an interest in defending ‘the civilization of which we are a part’ against the ‘anarchy’ that would result from a German victory. Germany was fighting for ‘a victory subversive of the world system in which America lives.’”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 190
Lippmann articulated a concept that after World War II became a defining principle of U.S. foreign policy. But those that saw a larger U.S. interest in establishing and maintaining an international system based on common “western” values were to be disappointed at the end of the First World War. Wilson failed to bring the country along to this ideal, and despite the victory over Germany the U.S. simply receded, diplomatically, to its pre-war mindset of little or no involvement after the war. Kagan shows us the disaster that entailed, for the world, and for the United States.
“It is the contention of this book that the United States had it within its power to preserve the peace in Europe after 1919, and at a manageable cost. But for reasons having little to do with capacity , Washington policymakers would not take the steps necessary. And while it is customary to focus on the collapse of world order in the 1930s it was in the 1920s that the peace was truly lost. By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, Hitler was already in power in Germany, and the self described “have-not” powers, which included Italy and Japan along with Germany, had already embarked on their determined attempt to undo the fragile order that Americans were half-heartedly attempting to establish.”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 220
Kagan lays out the thesis and then supports it with pretty difficult to argue with facts. With Europe in shambles from the war new diplomatic dynamics were being established, but as mentioned Washington was absent.
As Mark Twain said history doesn’t repeat itself but it does rhyme. As Woodrow Wilson fought for American participation in the League of Nations he was bitterly opposed by the national Republican Party.
“It was the party of Theodore Roosevelt who had asked Americans to ‘take a risk for internationalism.’ But in the process of opposing Wilson and the League, Lodge and his colleagues had radically shifted. The Republican Party became the party it would be for the next quarter century, the party that equated internationalism with Bolshevism, the party of ‘Americanism’ and insular nationalism, the party of rigid abstention from world politics, the party of William Borah. Republicans treated the League as if it were a European plot for world domination. They depicted France and Great Britain not as loyal allies who deserved American support but as greedy imperialists trying to bully and ensnare the United States in their wily scheme.”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 254
And so the short sighted American demand for full repayment of the war debts of Britain and France led to a circular firing squad, with these demands spurring continued allied demands on the defeated Germans for full reparation payments. And with no security structure in place in the absence of American involvement the financial, as well as the security fears of France and Germany, brought the world full circle.
“Americans on the scene-career diplomats, military officers, and political appointees alike-warned throughout the 1920s that the danger of another war was high, that American economic interests were threatened, and that absent a more active American diplomacy a ‘catastrophe’ loomed.” Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 302
Kagan’s historical analysis is quite right, and the history is precise. Kagan, of course, is not looking solely at Europe. In much the same manner as in Europe the problems in Asia were beginning to boil over as well. After WW I there was a serious power vacuum in Asia, and the Japanese moved to fill it. The danger was seen, but the will to take the necessary steps, primarily a naval buildup that would allow the U.S. to restore some “equilibrium” in the Pacific, just was not there.
“The U.S. minister to China, Paul Reinsch, warned that if Japan were not contained, it would become ‘the greatest engine of military oppression and dominance’ that the world had ever seen and that a ‘huge armed conflict’ would be ‘absolutely inevitable.’”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 314
Kagan takes us on the road to the Second World War, and how, even with the provocations of Hitler, it was still a non-interventionist bent in American public opinion. One of the issues that has always been of interest to me has been what the world, and U.S. response, to the Nazi policies and actions against the German Jewish population had been. Kagan gives us a truly great chapter on the U.S. response to Kristallnacht, and how that vile pogrom, in 1938, impacted U.S. public opinion in a way that was detrimental to Germany. Another chapter that made this book so very interesting to me.
Kagan has a point of view, and spells it out clearly. Agree or not the book will stimulate thought and discussion, and hopefully move that discussion to a higher plane.
This book is a wonderful read for those interested in this subject matter. Kagan has a chapter in the new book “The New Makers of Modern Strategy” which I have not yet arrived at, but I am looking forward to it. Highly recommended.
Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” is a monumental work of historical scholarship that meticulously examines the dynamics behind the ascent and decline of major global powers throughout history. Kennedy’s book is still considered a classic, and his scholarship continues to have relevance today. Originally published in 1987, Kennedy’s insights and analysis continue to resonate today, offering us lessons on the connection between the economic health and the military reach of the prominent empires of the past 500 years.
What is the theory? Kennedy sums it up in the introduction:
“It sounds crudely mercantilistic to express it this way but wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If however too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the same way, if a state overextends itself strategically-by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars-it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all-a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline.”
Kennedy, Paul The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers pg. xvi
Kennedy surveys the rise and fall of several great powers, including Spain, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to list a few. He traces their trajectories, exploring the complex factors that propelled their ascent and ultimately led to their decline. By examining multiple case studies, Kennedy constructs a comprehensive framework for understanding the recurrent patterns and common themes that characterize the rise and fall of great powers. The discussion can be technical, with economic tables spread throughout, but it is understandable.
Kennedy’s historical analysis is deeply rooted in economic factors. He emphasizes the critical role that economic strength plays in determining a nation’s ability to project power and sustain its position as a global leader. His examination of economic resources, technological advancements, and the management of finances sheds light on how economic imbalances can contribute to the decline of a power and create vulnerabilities that are exploited by rising powers. Kennedy’s analysis is concise, his conclusions difficult to refute.
Kennedy skillfully weaves political, military, and local factors into his narrative. He delves into the importance of military advancements, technological innovations, geopolitical strategies, and political institutions, in shaping the destiny of great powers. This multidimensional approach provides a nuanced understanding of the interplay between various elements and their impact on the rise and fall of nations.
“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” will not be for everyone, and could not be described as a page-turner. The book’s length and detailed analysis make it more of an academic exercise, but fascinating and illuminating for those interested. It stands as a seminal work that continues to shape our understanding of international relations and the dynamics of power. It is a true classic, and highly recommended.
The Seabrook Memorial Day Service and Parade was blessed with a wonderful day and great community participation. A big thank you to event organizer Cassandra Carter for all of her great work, the American Legion Post 70 for their participation, the Seabrook DPW for their work as well as the Seabrook Police Department for their work and assistance. Thanks to the Seabrook Board of Selectmen for their strong support and participation. Thanks to our legislative delegation as well!
The Town of Seabrook, through its Board of Selectmen, have announced a three year tax agreement with NextEra. This tax agreement covers fiscal years 2021, 2022, and 2023 and is in the amount of $40 million for the three year period. This agreement is for the property occupied by the nuclear power facility Seabrook Station, which is owned by NextEra.
The tax agreement will settle the NextEra appeal of the FY 2021 tax assessment, which had been filed, as well as the 2022 tax assessment, which NextEra had filed a notice of intent to appeal. The agreement does not require Seabrook to refund, or abate, property tax for any one of the years covered in the agreement. The FY 2022 assessed value of the plant is $1.2 billion.
The prior three year tax agreement covered FY 2018, 2019, and 2020 and was valued at $36 million.
The statement issued after the announcement is below.
“This negotiation, although longer than usual, has produced an agreement that increases the three-year tax payment by $4 million, an outcome that is extremely positive for the taxpayers of Seabrook. It is, at the same time, an equitable agreement for NextEra and the Town. The Board of Selectmen are pleased with the result, and grateful for the diligence and work of the staff, and the partnership with NextEra that brought these negotiations to a successful conclusion.”
