If there was ever an overused historical example it is the Munich Agreement that led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938. This overuse has numbed people to the analogy and it is likely that the actual details of the agreement have been largely forgotten by most. So what actually happened at Munich? Why has it come to represent the worst of diplomatic results when dealing with an aggressor nation? Let us unpack what actually happened at Munich, and in so doing see if the “playbook” looks familiar.
Adolph Hitler did not begin his expansionist actions with Czechoslovakia. Hitler strove, from the beginning, to escape from the terms imposed by the Wold War I victors through the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty prohibited any political union between Germany and Austria. Hitler controlled the Austrian Nazi Party, and through that organization created enormous political chaos in Austria, including the assassination of the Austrian Prime Minister in 1934, (a failed Nazi coup) and through the diplomatic bullying that Hitler was a master of eventually absorbing Austria in 1938. This was not the first violation of Versailles undertaken by Hitler, and like the prior violations the western powers chose to ignore it and hope for the best. Hitler explained to the Austrian Prime Minister that no country would come to their aid, and said of France:
“France, he said, could have stopped Germany in the Rhineland ‘and then we would have had to retreat. But now it is too late for France.’”
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 327
Hitler saw the writing on the wall for France. It was a prescient observation.
After the absorption of Austria Adolph Hitler began preparing the fate of Czechoslovakia. The nation of Czechoslovakia was a creation of the Treaty of Versailles, and always considered by Hitler, on that basis, to be illegitimate. Czechoslovakia had a disparate population, including a large German minority. A German political party, in the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia dominated by German speakers, quickly came under the control of Hitler, and like the Austrian Nazis, began making demands of the Czech government that could not be satisfied. Hitler’s political demands centered around the treatment, by the Czech government, of its German minority. Hitler’s true intent was the military liquidation of Czechoslovakia and its absorption into the German Reich. His plans for this included the preparation of Case Green, the military codename for a German attack on Czechoslovakia. The fig leaf of mistreatment of the German minority was never the real issue. Hitler, before provoking the Czech crisis, had prepared the German military for a lightning strike on Czechoslovakia. In meeting with the German Sudeten leader Konrad Heinlein Hitler gave specific instructions:
“Hitler’s instructions, as revealed in a Foreign Office memorandum, were that ‘demands should be made by the Sudeten German Party which are unacceptable to the Czech government.’”
“As Heinlein himself summarized the Fuehrer’s views, ‘We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied.’”
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 359
The Czech state had security commitments from France and the Soviet Union that should have rendered military assistance in the event of aggression against it. The British had warned Hitler that if France honored that commitment the British would support the French militarily. The Czechs had a very formidable military and a very extensive set of fortifications that would have to be breached by the Germans in the event of a military confrontation while the French and Soviets would be supporting the Czechs. From a military perspective the Germans would have had a heavy lift if the mutual security agreements had been honored. So what happened?
The continuing pressure of Hitler on both the Czechs, and by extension the French and British, managed to pry the Czech allies away. It is easy today to condemn British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain for his actions, but Chamberlain believed that Hitler had a legitimate grievance and that a world war over the Sudetenland was not worth the cost. He also believed the “assurances” received from Hitler on this matter. (Hitler told Chamberlain, and the world, that this was his last territorial demand in Europe.) Chamberlain was in error on both counts but that was not so clear at the time. The Hitler “playbook” on these matters was not fully understood. Munich has become the focal point of this story, but in fact the “Czech crisis” drummed up by Hitler brought Chamberlain to Germany three times to meet with Hitler. (September 15, September 22, and finally at Munich September 29)Hitler’s core demand was that the Sudetenland portion of Czechoslovakia be ceded to Germany and militarily occupied by the German army. In the run-up to Munich the Czech government had refused to accede to this German demand, realizing that to do so would place what was left of their country under direct military threat from Germany, as the military fortifications referenced above fell within the area to be ceded. When the Czech government finally gave way on the dismemberment of their country it was because the French and British abandoned Czechoslovakia to its fate. Hitler had managed to split the alliance, and neuter the security guarantees given to the Czech government by France. In so doing the British and the French managed to place responsibility for whether war broke out on the victim state. In a September 27 note to Czech President Benes Chamberlain wrote:
“…Chamberlain could not refrain from admonishing them, in the last part of his message, ‘that Bohemia would be overrun by the German Army and nothing which another Power or Powers could do would be able to save your country and your people from such a fate. This remains true whatever the result of a world war might be.’ Thus Chamberlain was putting the responsibility for peace or war no longer on Hitler but on Benes.”
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 402
Blaming the victim of aggression, rather than the aggressor.
Hitler, in his diplomatic maneuvering against the Czech state, had pressured the Hungarians and the Poles to make their own territorial demands against the Czechs, which they did. Germany was the main driver, but not the sole actor, in this tragedy. It would turn out to be a most unfortunate decision by Poland.
Hitler’s real thoughts on the Czech state were not hidden. In a speech on September 26 that was described by William Shirer as the first time he had ever seen Hitler totally lose control of himself Hitler said this about the nation of Czechoslovakia: (Speaking of Benes at the Treaty of Versailles negotiation)
“He made his great appearance in Versailles, claiming that there was such a thing as a Czechoslovakian nation. He resorted to this lie to make his own people sound, despite their meager numbers, more important and to lend credence to its demand for greater influence. At the time, the Anglo-Saxon powers, renowned for their great lack of knowledge in geographic and volkisch matters, did not deem it necessary to investigate Beneš’ claim. Otherwise they most certainly would have realized that there is no such thing as a Czechoslovakian nation. All there is are Czechs and Slovaks and the Slovaks have little desire of being with the Czechs, rather . . . In the end, thanks to the efforts of Herr Beneš, the Czechs annexed Slovakia. Since this state did not appear to be a viable structure, they simply took three and a half million Germans in clear defiance of the rights and desires of the Germans for self-determination. Since that evidently did not suffice, the Czechs took another million of Magyars, adding a number of Carpatho-Russians and several hundreds of thousands of Poles.
That is the state that would later call itself Czechoslovakia. It exists contrary to the clear desire and will of the nations thus raped and in clear defiance of their right to self-determination. As I speak to you today, I naturally have pity on the fate of these oppressed peoples. I am touched by the fate of these Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, and Ukrainians. Yet I can only be the voice of the fate of my Germans.”
Hitler Speech Sportpalast September 26, 1938
We see the denial of Czechoslovakia as a legitimate state. We see the blaming of the victim of aggression for the aggression, with the rationale being that the Czechs would not stand a chance against the German army. And we see that the British and French undertook to “guarantee” the remaining borders of rump Czechoslovakia through the Munich Agreement. So after making territorial concessions demanded by its putative allies rump Czechoslovakia was now going to rely on those same allies to “guarantee” what was left of the Czech state. Hitler, with the Munich Agreement still drying, had other plans.
Hitler, using the by now familiar tactics of diplomatic bullying and blackmail, induced the Slovaks to declare independence from rump Czechoslovakia, further sealing the fate of the Czech nation. This was of course accompanied by the newly “independent” Slovakia sending Hitler a telegram requesting that Germany “take over the protection of the new state.” (Both the declaration of independence and the telegram were written by the Germans.) With rump Czechoslovakia further reduced Adolph Hitler summoned the President of what was left of the Czech State and brow-beat the hapless Dr. Emil Hacha into submission. On March 15, 1939 in the early morning hour Dr. Hacha signed a statement, while in Germany, asking for the protection of Germany for what was left of the Czech state, which Hitler was more than happy to provide. The Germans occupied Prague as part of their final destruction of the rump Czech state on the same day. What about the British and French “security guarantees” to rump Czechoslovakia?
After the occupation of Prague Chamberlain took the position that the Slovak declaration of independence from the Czech state had nullified that guarantee.
“ ‘The effect of this declaration’ he explained, ‘put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontier we had proposed to guarantee. His Majesty’s Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.’ “
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 451
That position of the Prime Minister came under vehement attack in Great Britain, where Hitler’s duplicity was now evident for all but the willfully blind to see. After some thought Chamberlain came to see the Hitler maneuver for what it was and he issued a new statement.
“Is this the end of an old adventure or is it the beginning of a new? Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in effect, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?”
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 454
The Prime Minister, his eyes now fully opened, would give the British guarantee on Poland sixteen days after the German occupation of Prague.
As stated above the “Munich analogy” has been vastly overused. But that should not stop us from recognizing the playbook used so effectively, and to such destructive effect, by Adolph Hitler. You do not have to “be Hitler” to utilize the same diplomatic tactics he used, and we should understand why the Europeans are so aware of that playbook, and why some now choose to try to rewrite the history of German aggression in the run-up to the start of World War 2. The details matter. Attempts by pseudo historians like Darryl Cooper to rewrite that history by portraying Churchill as the villain of World War 2 are simply attempts to erase the details that matter, and make comparisons to those using that playbook today harder to make. The essential elements of the Hitlerite diplomatic thrusts are fairly visible to all.
- Deny the historical legitimacy of the victim nation, as Hitler did to the Czechs.
- Use the presence of a minority that speaks the language of the aggressor state to make claims of repression, and whip up national outrage over the mistreatment.
- Seize land, either by military force or by having it ceded, (or both) and then dictate the terms of the survival of the rump state, and wait for further opportunity to finish the initial job. (Limitations on the rump state military are a favorite term)
The overuse of Hitler and Munich should not prevent us from seeing aggressor nations for what they are. The idea that aggressors simply wish to rectify a historical wrong and will be satisfied digesting only one nation inevitably leads to further carnage. German generals, in testimony at Nuremberg, said that the military position of Germany, in 1938, was simply not strong enough to win a two front war with Czechoslovakia and France.
Field Marshall von Manstein, at Nuremberg, said:
“If a war had broken out, neither our western border nor our Polish frontier could have been effectively defended by us, and there is no doubt whatsoever that had Czechoslovakia defended herself, we would have been held up by her fortifications, for we did not have the means to break through.”
Shirer, William The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich pg. 424
The West miscalculated, and everybody paid a horrible price. Standing up collectively to the aggressor in Czechoslovakia might have spared the world untold horrors. Hitler had not, in fact, made his last territorial demand in Europe. After giving such assurances he was, six months after the occupation of Prague, knocking on Poland’s door. Allowing land disputes to be settled by military action is a sure fire way to ensure that aggression will continue. History, in this area, has taught us some hard lessons. I hope we remember them.