Zhou Enlai: A Life by Chen Jian
My rating: 5 of 5 stars
For those interested in modern Chinese history, revolutionary politics, or the personalities who shaped the twentieth century, Zhou Enlai: A Life by Chen Jian is an important and highly worthwhile work. Zhou Enlai remains one of the most fascinating and elusive political figures of the modern era, admired by many as the sophisticated, pragmatic, and humane face of the Chinese Communist leadership. That reputation does not take away from the fact that Zhou was a committed cadre of the Chinese Communist Party, whose administrative skill and enormous work ethic carried the Party during some very dark times after the assumption of power in 1949.
The challenge in writing about Zhou Enlai is that he has often been viewed through two sharply contrasting lenses. In the West, he has frequently been remembered as the polished diplomat who helped engineer the opening to the United States, managing the historic encounter with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with extraordinary skill. Within China, he has often been portrayed as the loyal but moderating hand within a revolutionary system that frequently descended into ideological excess and political violence. Chen does not fully accept either simplified version, and that is to the book’s credit. Instead, he presents Zhou as a deeply committed revolutionary whose pragmatism existed not in opposition to the Communist project, but in service to it.
An enormous amount of history is compressed into Zhou’s life. His early intellectual development amid the collapse of imperial China, the revolutionary ferment of the May Fourth era, the long struggle for Communist survival, the civil war, the establishment of the People’s Republic, the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet split, the chaos of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, and ultimately the diplomatic opening to the United States all receive substantial attention. Any one of these topics could easily fill a separate volume, and Chen succeeds in showing how Zhou’s political identity evolved across these successive crises while remaining rooted in a profound loyalty to the revolutionary cause.
What makes the book especially compelling is its refusal to indulge in comforting myths. Zhou has often benefited from favorable comparisons to Mao Zedong, particularly because Mao’s catastrophic ideological campaigns make almost anyone around him appear comparatively restrained. That restraint, though well disguised, was discernible enough to get him in constant hot water at times when the Chinese Communist Party was undertaking some of Chairman Mao’s great ideological campaigns, like the Cultural Revolution. Zhou’s attempts to soften the very sharp edges of some of Mao’s undertakings were called out by many, and though in a position of power he was forced, on several occasions, to submit harsh self criticisms. He was always clever enough to stay slightly ahead of the ideological mob, and though Mao himself was the hand behind much of the Zhou criticism he realized the essential role played by “the Premier” and never let the attacks get to the point where Zhou was eliminated from government. He was, for Mao, the indispensable man.
Chen’s analysis of Zhou’s diplomatic abilities is especially strong. Zhou’s role in China’s external relations required navigating relationships with some of the most consequential figures of the twentieth century, including Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, Nixon, and Kissinger. His performance in diplomacy was undeniably extraordinary, combining patience, tactical skill, and a clear understanding of political leverage. Very few have left such a massive legacy of achievement. With the recent trip to China just concluded by President Donald Trump many questions have arisen on the American policy towards Taiwan. Zhou, from the Chinese side, was the principal architect of the China/U.S. “understanding” on Taiwan. That alone is worth a few words. In 1960, under the guidance of Zhou:
“At a Politburo meeting in May CCP leaders decided to adopt a new policy line with the understanding that ‘it is better to put Taiwan in the hands of Chiang and his son than to allow it to be controlled by the Americans.’ They elaborated that ‘the liberation of Taiwan cannot be done in a hurry. If not by this generation, it could be done by the next generation once conditions have been gradually created and the right moment has come.’”
Chen Jian Zhou Enlai A Life pg. 460
The widely quoted dictum by Deng Xiaoping, “hide your strength, bide your time” which came much later, owes some intellectual debt to Zhou. When both the Nixon Administration and the Chinese determined that it was time for the (non) relationship to move from open hostility to mutual accommodation it was Zhou who was the chief engineer of the rapprochement, and who with Henry Kissinger devised the Shanghai Communique, dealing with not only the Taiwan issue but a whole host of issues between the countries. The communique is one of the most remarkable diplomatic efforts ever undertaken, and the finessing of the Taiwan issue by Zhou and Kissinger showed lesser diplomats how to achieve agreement even when it appears that no agreement is possible. The Taiwan finesse read:
“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”
The Shanghai Communique 1972
That position has never changed. Zhou and Kissinger’s formulation, while placed under stress at times, has stood the test of time.
Henry Kissinger, who dealt with so many of the giant figures of his era, had this to say about Zhou.
“In some sixty years of public life, I have encountered no more compelling figure than Zhou Enlai.”
Kissinger, Henry “On China” pg. 241.
One further anecdote from Kissinger reflects his deep respect for Zhou’s diplomatic skills. In advance of the opening to China, and before real contact had been made between the parties, Zhou engineered a visit to Beijing by Edgar Snow, a journalist with a friendly relationship with Mao. Zhou arranged for Snow to be photographed with Mao at the National Day celebration, leaving a signal for the U.S. that they might be open to a change in the relationship.
“Yet the message went unnoticed by Kissinger, who later acknowledged that the Chinese ‘overestimated our subtlety.’”
Chen Jian Zhou Enlai A Life pg. 628
The book, as mentioned, compresses an immense life central to the development of modern China into one volume. There is much more to the Zhou story than the opening to America. I have highlighted that part of his story because I am more familiar with it, but Zhou’s life story encompasses the rise of China.
For those looking for a deeper understanding of China this book is essential. It neither canonizes Zhou as the wise moderate nor condemns him as merely another authoritarian functionary. Instead, it presents a portrait of a man of remarkable discipline, intellect, and political skill who devoted those gifts to a revolutionary enterprise that produced both historic transformation and immense human suffering.
Zhou Enlai remains one of history’s most enigmatic political figures, and Chen Jian does not entirely unlock the full story. But he does provide a thoughtful, rigorous, and insightful examination of a man whose influence on modern China—and indeed on the global balance of power—was immense. A must read for serious students of history, diplomacy, and modern China.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQZsHXD0OnQ
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