Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael R. Gordon

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


This book, due to its length and extraordinary level of operational and strategic detail, will not be for everyone. But for those who want a serious and deeply informed understanding of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Cobra II is an essential work. Written by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, the book provides a comprehensive account of the planning, execution, and aftermath of the Iraq War, and stands as one of the most authoritative narratives on the subject. General George Patton’s Third Army, in its World War II drive from Normandy, named the operation Cobra. Lt. General David McKiernan, the Third Army commander, decided to name the drive to Baghdad Cobra II. You can’t go wrong emulating Patton.

An enormous amount of material is covered here, from the internal debates within the administration of George W. Bush, to the Pentagon’s war planning under Donald Rumsfeld, to the execution of the “light footprint” invasion strategy that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime with remarkable speed. The authors carefully trace the evolution of the war plan, including the tension between traditional military doctrine and Rumsfeld’s push for a leaner, faster force, and the consequences of those decisions as American troops moved rapidly toward Baghdad. Equally important is the book’s examination of what was not adequately planned—the postwar occupation—which ultimately proved to be far more difficult and consequential than the invasion itself. That failure was highlighted repeatedly. Marine General Anthony Zinni had his own thoughts.

“The Jordanians and Kuwaitis, in particular, were concerned that Saddam’s days might be numbered and that Iraq might implode if he was toppled, leading to chaos on their frontier. Zinni was also concerned that Iraq could shatter and he then would be called on to restore order and keep the nation from fragmenting along ethnic lines. Containing Saddam was not the problem. It was filling a a potential power vacuum that worried him. Zinni was not eager to invade Iraq and thought the idea of arming anti-Saddam insurgents was lunacy, but if the Iraqi’s did the job themselves he had to be ready.”

Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 26

Gordon and Trainor do an excellent job of showing how the various components of the operation were interconnected. Intelligence assessments regarding weapons of mass destruction, assumptions about how Iraqi forces and civilians would react, and confidence in rapid regime collapse all fed into a strategy that achieved initial military success but left significant gaps in the transition to stability. The authors present these connections in a clear and compelling way, demonstrating how decisions made months or even years before the invasion shaped outcomes on the ground. The detail on the military aspects is pretty deep, and on this point there was a citation of a military saying that bears repeating:

“Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics.”

Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 96

Rumsfeld’s insistence on a “small footprint” had more than a single flaw. It created some true logistical nightmares for the real war planners. The military war planners well understood the problems with the nonsense being put forward by Rumsfeld and his team. I was a bit disappointed that the famous quote attributed to Tommy Franks in describing the intellectual ability of Doug Feith was not included in the book. Feith, despite that, still draws some heavy, well deserved criticism. A discussion of the administration plan to recruit Iraqi freedom fighters to “aid” the U.S. military turned into a total fiasco, leading to the book’s observation that:

“White House officials and CENTCOM said that the fiasco showed that Feith and his team were better at drafting conservative policy manifestos than instituting programs.”

Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 107

The book does not shy away from criticism. There is a clear-eyed assessment of the shortcomings in planning for the occupation, including the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the failure to anticipate the insurgency that followed. At the same time, the authors give due credit to the professionalism and adaptability of U.S. military commanders in the field, who executed a complex and fast-moving campaign under significant constraints. The narrative strikes a careful balance, avoiding both polemic and apology, and instead focusing on a detailed reconstruction of events and decisions.

For the student of military history and foreign policy, the cast of characters is both extensive and consequential. Figures such as Tommy Franks, Paul Wolfowitz, and Jay Garner play central roles, along with numerous others in both the military and civilian leadership. Beside the criticism of the Administration Tommy Franks did not really come off well, though I have a fondness for him, likely in part because of his accurate assessment of Feith. Franks was in a difficult position, balancing the military needs as he understood them and the ridiculous amount of interference from Rumsfeld. A military decision to omit some key military units (First Armored and First Cavalry) that Franks wanted was Rumsfeld driven, though later there would be some explanation that Franks had approved.

“‘We had First Armored and First Cavalry in the flow,’Franks said. ‘Don Rumsfeld did in fact make the decision to off-ramp the First Cavalry Division.’ Tom White, the civilian Army secretary, had a less charitable view. ‘Rumsfeld just ground Franks down,’ White said. ‘If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say, “Screw it, I’ll do the best I can with what I have.’ The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing with him.’”

Cobra II The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor pg. 461

The authors provide insight into their personalities, their disagreements, and their influence on the conduct of the war. As with any work of this scope, the authors are ultimately constructing a narrative that will help define how this conflict is remembered, but they do so with a level of rigor and sourcing that lends the book considerable credibility.

The Iraq War remains one of the most controversial foreign policy decisions in modern American history. Cobra II does not attempt to resolve that debate, but it does provide an indispensable foundation for understanding how and why the war unfolded as it did. For historians, policy analysts, and serious readers of contemporary history, this book is essential reading.



View all my reviews