Tim Pat Coogan gives us a tour de force on Michael Collins, the man who  made Ireland,  in this book which is both a biography of the “big fella” and a history of a critical point in Ireland. These events are still argued about today, and of course led to the great split in the Irish movement for independence that brought the Irish civil war, a tragedy for the entire country.

There can be no mistake about where Coogan stands on the events that led to the creation of the Irish Free State and the civil war. He is unabashedly on the Michael Collins side of that argument. If you have some sympathy for Eamon De Valera this might not be the book for you.

The book is thick with details, which some have said made it a difficult read, especially for those that might not be familiar with this era of Irish history. Tim Pat has a lot of ground to cover, as the biography of Collins is simply intertwined with Eamon De Valera and the Irish movement of independence. You cannot tell the story of Michael Collins without getting into the weeds of the movement for Irish independence. It was Collins whole life.

Michael Collins was a volunteer and survived the disaster of the Easter uprising of 1916. The military failure forever colored Collins views on how to militarily confront the superior British force stationed in Ireland. Static warfare would lead Collins to master the tactics of a guerrilla campaign against the British. As successful as his tactics were even this eventually brought Collins into conflict with Eamon De Valera.

Collins life and death were tied to Irish history, and to the other giant of the Irish independence movement, Eamon De Valera. The eventual split in the movement, and the basis of the Irish Civil War, in large part was attributable to the eventual break between Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera. This book, by necessity, delves into that break, how it happened, and who the author thinks bears ultimate responsibility for the costly divide. 

After the debacle of 1916 Eamon De Valera assumed overall leadership of the Irish Republican movement, but Michael Collins was a driving force in the movement, acting as Director of Finance, Director of Intelligence, as well as many other roles in the self declared Republican government of Ireland. He was a member of the first Dail, and though he made some enemies within the movement his leadership was simply immense. When Eamon De Valera decided to travel to America to build political support as well as gather financial support Collins was left in charge. The Collins success in prosecuting the guerrilla campaign against the British included a high degree of brutality, including executions of key British personnel in Ireland by a squad of assassins put together by Collins. The “squad”, or the “12 Apostles” put together by Collins, inflicted heavy damage on the British police and military infrastructure in Ireland. Collins was able to identify and mark for execution many British assets through superior gathering of intelligence, including turning key workers for the British in Ireland into informants for him. He was responsible for floating the national loan that financed the war effort and the activities of entire “Irish government” that claimed legal authority over the entire country. It was the war efforts of Collins, without any doubt, that drove the British to sue for some sort of accommodation with the Irish. That process, supposedly led on the Irish side by De Valera, became the point of fracture between Collins and De Valera. That fracture would have horrible ramifications for the Irish movement, and would cost Collins his life.

What was the cause of the split? Before we get to that question let us look at how Coogan described the De Valera trip to the United States, where he became embroiled in a major political dispute with prominent Irish American supporters of Irish independence. The De Valera stubborn streak, or maybe straight out hubris, is described.

At an early stage in the De Valera tour one Irish-American leader, watching the tensions build up, commented that the best thing to do with De Valera was ‘turn everything over to him. He will make a failure of it , but a failure is better than a split. And a split is certain unless De Valera can have his way.’

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 190

When the British made peace overtures to the Irish several key questions faced the Irish. The Irish government embraced the declaration of a Republic by the Easter 1916 rebellion. The commitment to the establishment of an Irish Republic with authority over the entire island was a key tenet of Irish Republican political thought. It was a difficult, if not impossible political goal in light of British policy and politics. The status of Northern Ireland was a sensitive one for both sides. Like today the counties that made up Northern Ireland were a political football in British politics, with “unionist” sentiment a majority in what became Northern Ireland. That majority had close political ties to the Conservative Party in Great Britain and that made any deal on the North very difficult. The second key question for the Irish was whether something less than a Republic could meet their political goals.  The British, at this juncture, were simply not going to take the great leap towards a Republic for Ireland that would force a disassociation from the Crown. With those challenges ahead both sides agreed to a truce in place in July of 1921 in the hope of reaching some sort of agreement.

The truce of 1921 had some major military ramifications. Collins had fought the British to a standstill using guerrilla tactics that were often quite harsh. His intelligence network, and his fighters, were operating under a certain cover. With the truce declared Collins worried about what might happen should the negotiations fail and hostilities re-commence.

“He commented, ‘once a truce is agreed, and we come out in the open, it is extermination for us if the truce should fail…We shall be like rabbits coming out from their holes.’”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 217

This Collins analysis would go a long way towards explaining his later actions.

De Valera agreed to travel to London for direct talk with British P.M. David Lloyd George on July 12, 1921. The Irish delegation did not include Collins, who was omitted from the team by De Valera over Collins protests. This decision by De Valera also would go a long way, in my view, to explain the later disaster.

In his meetings with Lloyd George De Valera remained difficult to pin down. In a report from Lloyd George to the British cabinet on his discussions with De Valera the P.M. said:

“After three {there were actually four in all} interviews with Mr. De Valera, aggregating several hours, I found it difficult to see exactly where the Irish leader stood…What he wanted was a Republic, but this the Prime Minister had said was impossible, being inconsistent with the Monarchy. Mr. De Valera however had not admitted this inconsistency…as the conversation progressed , it became increasingly clear that Ulster was the real difficulty.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 221

This articulation of the British position on a Republic in direct meetings with De Valera, was also critical in understanding the pivotal events that would soon come.

The conference did not end in agreement, but further discussions continued, with plans for a second British/Irish conference. In the run-up to the second conference De Valera and Lloyd George exchanged multiple letters. Within those exchanges the parameters of British flexibility became obvious for all to see, and likely lead De Valera to some fateful decisions. In outlining the Irish position in advance of the second round De Valera, in a note to Lloyd George, stated that

“our nation has formally declared its independence and recognizes itself as a sovereign State. It is only as the representatives of that State, and as its chosen guardians, that we have any authority or powers to act on behalf of our people.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 225

Lloyd George rejected this formulation clearly.

“From the very outset of our conversation I told you that we looked to Ireland to own allegiance to the Thrown, and to make her future as a member of the British Commonwealth. That was the basis of our proposals and we cannot alter it. The status which you now claim in advance for your delegates is, in effect, a repudiation of that basis.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 225

This was not the end of the correspondence between the two, and I will give additional text. But before I do we see the very clear position of the British on the concept of an Irish Republic. De Valera, seeing the British inflexibility on this issue, followed with a note offering to go to a conference with no pre-conditions. This effectively acknowledged that the British did not recognize the delegation as representatives of an Irish Republic. The Lloyd George response, and invitation said:

“His Majesty’s Government…cannot enter a conference upon the basis of this correspondence. Notwithstanding your personal assurance to the contrary, which they much appreciate, it might be argued in future that the acceptance of a conference on this basis had involved them in a recognition which no British Government can accord. On this point they must guard themselves against any doubt…The position taken up by His Majesty’s Government is fundamental to the existence of the British Empire and they cannot alter it. My colleagues and I remain, however, keenly anxious to make in co-operation with your delegates another determined effort to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion…We, therefore, send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in London on 11 October, where we can meet your delegates as spokesmen of the people you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 226

When the split came Collins would shred the De Valera argument that the only acceptable negotiated settlement would be British recognition of the Irish Republic by pointing to De Valera’s acceptance of the conference on the basis of this very correspondence. We get a bit ahead of the story, but Collins later said, after the split:

“The communication of September 29th from Lloyd George made it clear that they were going into a conference not on recognition of the Irish Republic… if we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very easily have said so, and there would have been no conference…it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 226

Robert Barton, a member of the second Irish delegation who ended up opposing the Treaty and falling out with Collins, nonetheless agreed with this idea.

“In these preliminaries the English refused to recognize us as acting on behalf of the Irish Republic and the fact that we agreed negotiate at all on any other basis was possibly the primary cause of our downfall. Certainly it was the first milestone on the road to disaster.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 227

As mentioned I got a bit ahead of the story. With the conference set the Irish leadership had to determine who would go to London for this make or break negotiation. The first conference was led by De Valera, who left Collins at home. This time De Valera made the fateful decision to send Michael Collins to London while he stayed in Dublin. This disastrous decision has been analyzed repeatedly over the years. De Valera’s explanations for not leading the delegation were, in my view,  nonsensical. As the so called “President of the Irish Republic” De Valera had an obligation to lead the delegation and do the negotiating. Coogan offers De Valera no relief here:

“Having left Collins at home while he teased out from Lloyd George what was on offer, he now, having found out, began to steer Collins towards the negotiating table in Downing Street.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 227

De Valera would later compound his errors in ways that ripped apart the Irish independence movement. But this cynical ploy started the Irish, as Barton points out, on the road to disaster. Knowing full well that any potential agreement would be something short of recognition of a Republic De Valera sent Collins, knowing that either failure or a compromise would be the result. He did not want to be associated with either. In response to the many objections to De Valera not going to London, including strenuous objection from Collins, De Valera said:

“He said that he himself would go if he were not the President, the ‘symbol of the Republic.’ The ‘symbol’ should be untouched…not compromised by any arrangements which it might be necessary for plenipotentiaries to make.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 229

Coogan mentions “Machiavellian” in describing the thought process of De Valera. I agree.

A tragic set of misunderstandings, mixed in with some bad faith, combined to create some major issues that would come back to haunt the Irish. The delegation was sent as

plenipotentiaries, with the Irish Dail empowering them as such. Coogan mentions De Valera’s attempt to apply handcuffs, but does not make clear that their power was subject to the limits desired by De Valera. (Send back a draft treaty to Dublin and await a reply before signing) Arthur Griffith, whose contributions to the Irish independence movement were enormous, was the nominal Chair of the Irish delegation. As expected the British were only willing to go so far, and any idea of a negotiated solution that placed Ireland outside of the British Commonwealth was a non-starter. The British delegation included Lloyd George, Churchill, and Birkenhead, an A list of talent. The Irish delegation was assigned by De Valera to be “balanced” but had some less than stellar personalities. The Irish submitted a De Valera driven idea of “External Association” that was soundly rejected by the British, who offered Dominion status. The Irish delegates were in fact back and forth to Ireland to report, but the Irish Cabinet was badly divided, and simply did not offer clear instruction. At the critical time, with negotiations coming close to an end, De Valera once again refused to join the delegation.

The sides narrowed the differences, and the Irish delegation signed the draft Treaty that included the oath to the British Crown and Dominion status, with the Ulster question deferred. Collins, in a statement to Birkenhead, said “I may have just signed my actual death warrant.”

After the signing the row began, with De Valera’s reaction one of outrage:

“They managed to get him a few minutes after he had read the Evening Mail. He was in a ‘towering rage.’ Duggan handed him the Treaty, and noticing that he was taking no interest in it, asked him to read it. “Why should I read it?’ was the reply. Taken aback, Duggan told him about the publication arrangement and pointed out that it was then nearly eight o’clock. ‘What,’ exclaimed De Valera, ‘to be published whether I have seen it or not-whether I approve or not?’”

De Valera, in a fit of pique over the plenipotentiaries having signed an agreement without his assent, after having refused to go to London himself, now moved to expel Collins, and two other delegation members, from the Cabinet. He did this before they had arrived back from London, and without offering them an opportunity to defend their actions. Machiavelli had made his move. De Valera had miscalculated, and this brazen move to eliminate Collins politically failed.

The De Valera argument, that the signing of the Treaty without a referral back to him or the Cabinet, was a violation of a pledge made by Arthur Griffith, in the light of history, may have some merit. But that merit gets washed away by the fact that the Treaty was subject to ratification by the Irish Dail. It was referred back, and could have been rejected by the elected representatives of the Irish people. The Dail debate was truly vicious, and both sides of the debate gave as good as they got. A piece of the debate by Collins is worth looking at. Speaking of the Treaty Collins said:

“In my opinion it gives us the freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it…we have stated we would not coerce the North-East. We have stated it officially. I stated it publicly in Armagh and nobody has found fault with me. What was the use of talking big phrases about not agreeing to the partition of our country. Surely we recognize that the North East corner does exist, and surely our intention was that we should take such steps would lead to mutual understanding. The Treaty has made an effort…to deal with it on lines that will lead very rapidly to goodwill and the entry of the North East under the Irish Parliament.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 301

De Valera made some truly horrible decisions in this time frame. His debate position urged the Dail to adopt what became known as “Document No. 2. This document, similar in many respects to the actual Treaty, cost De Valera some critical support from hardliners. Document No. 2 can safely be called an exercise in ego, and unacceptable to the British.

De Valera’s stature was such that many attempts at compromise were offered, and rebuffed by him directly. Making the Provisional Free State Government subsidiary to the Irish Dail by an act of the Dail was agreed to by both sides, including Collins, and brought to De Valera, who rejected it.

“Joseph McGuiness said in the Dail afterwards ‘the people on this side literally went on their knees to President De Valera to try to preserve the unity of the country, …in private session the next morning de Valera thumped the table and said:’There is no use in discussing it. The whole of Ireland will not get me to be a national apostate and I am not going to connive at setting up in Ireland another government for England.’”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 303

The whole of Ireland phrase would prove prophetic. Before the debate was over the Cabinet Minister for Defense, Cathal Brugha, launched an all out attack on Collins. That relationship had been badly strained for years, and the Treaty broke it. In response to this attack on Collins Arthur Griffith said Collins:

“He was the man that made the situation: he was the man, and nobody knows it better than I do how, during a year and a half he worked from six in the morning until two the next morning. He was the man whose matchless energy, whose indomitable will carried Ireland through the terrible crisis and though I have not now, and never have had, an ambition, about either political affairs or history, if my name is to go down in history I want it associated with the name of Michael Collins. Michael Collins was the man who fought the Black and Tans for twelve months until England was forced to offer terms.

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 306

Griffith, in the final analysis, had it right. The Dail voted in favor of the Treaty, by a margin of 64-57. De Valera, in response, announced his resignation, moving the country on a course of disaster.

As the sides engaged in political sparring De Valera gave a speech in which he said:

If they accepted the Treaty, and if the Volunteers of the future tried to complete the work the Volunteers of the last four years had been attempting they…would have to wade through Irish blood, through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish government, and through perhaps, the blood of some of the members of the Government in order to get Irish freedom.

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 319

The blood of fellow Irishmen, who themselves had fought the British side by side with De Valera. Truly despicable, and a comment that hung around his neck for the rest of his life. The best efforts of Collins to restore some unity, including forming an electoral pact with the anti-treaty elements, all ended up foundering. The Anti-treaty wing of the IRA, Collins comrades in an earlier period, seized a Free State building in Dublin, and while Collins likely waited too long, eventually Free State forces took back the building, triggering the Civil War. Collins, in an ambush, was killed in that conflict.

De Valera’s hypocrisy was shown years after Collins death by his willingness to enter the Free State Government with the oath of allegiance to the Crown still a part of the entry requirement. He took over the Free State government after abstaining from participating, and at some point years later cracked down on his ostensible allies in the IRA. Collins vision, that the formation of the Free State was a steppingstone to further progress, had been borne out. Coogan ends the book with a quote from De Valera, who through his many years in power was small and petty over any attempts to honor the service of Michael Collins:

“I can’t see my way to becoming Patron of the Michael Collins Foundation. It’s my considered opinion that in the fullness of time history will record the greatness of Collins and it will be recorded at my expense.”

The Man Who Made Ireland: The Life and Death of Michael Collins Tim Pat Coogan pg. 432

Collins was indeed, in his short time here, a man of greatness. His vision, and his willingness to endure much political animus, brought forward the nation of Ireland. During this St. Patrick’s Day month we should remember the monumental contributions of the Big Fella, Michael Collins.