Henry Kissinger Years of Upheaval

Posted on December 16, 2023 by billmanzi

Years of Upheaval by Henry Kissinger

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


The recent death of Henry Kissinger has brought all sorts of writing on his career, and in death the controversy and arguments over his impacts, his actions while in power, and even his actions and writing after leaving office, have been renewed with some level of vigor. I do believe that Kissinger, always looking to be in the limelight, would have been delighted with the attention he has been receiving.

Kissinger was, without question, and by his own admission, someone with a very healthy ego. His memoirs are in three volumes, with this volume (2) coming in at 1214 pages. I have read the first two, and as observed for the first volume this book will not be for everyone. The other similarity to be noted is that Kissinger uses his memoirs to burnish his reputation, and to justify some fairly controversial decisions reached during his tenure. Critics point to this as if it would be unusual for a memoir writer to justify actions taken during his tenure. It must be taken into account but does not take away from the vast historical importance of his writings here.

Volume two begins with the advent of Richard Nixon’s second term. This term, for Nixon, would end in disaster, and that disaster would be a significant factor in Kissinger amassing as much influence and power that he came to have. Kissinger does not ignore the political storm that came to destroy the Nixon Administration in his writings, bemoaning the fact that Nixon’s preoccupation with Watergate, and his diminishing political authority, caused serious problems for him as he tried to maneuver in so many areas of critical foreign policy decision making. Kissinger treats Nixon gently, but in his own way makes clear that Nixon’s effectiveness, and his stability, were clearly at issue as Watergate accelerated.

Many have mocked the three volumes as a testament to Kissinger’s massive ego, and in reading this volume there is no doubt that the twelve hundred pages could have come in a bit lighter. In fairness Kissinger (and Nixon) dealt with some enormous issues over the course of Kissinger’s tenure, and Kissinger deals with these in detail, and I believe contributes greatly to the ultimate historical understanding of some critical events.

Kissinger is the only man to serve jointly as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, and will likely be the only man that will ever do so. Nixon’s appointment of him as Secretary starts this volume, and Kissinger gets right into Cambodia, a subject that has engendered massive criticism of his actions to this very day. Kissinger, for all the criticism, lays out the actions undertaken to counter the North Vietnamese intrusion, and semi-occupation, of Cambodia. The Kissinger/Nixon prescription to the North Vietnamese utilization of Cambodia as a safe haven for its troops, and as a transit route for supplying its troops in the South, was to introduce U.S. air power, and eventually troops, into Cambodia. This expansion of the war to Cambodia came with enormous criticism, which Kissinger took on directly.

“The absurd myth by which guilt for abandoning Cambodia has been assured runs like this: Cambodia was a peaceful, happy land until America attacked it. There was no reason for this attack: it was the product of the psychosis of two American leaders determined to act out their own insecurities on the prostrate body of an innocent people. They covertly dislodged the only political leader, Sihanouk, who held the fabric of the country together. Then American bombing turned a group of progressive revolutionaries, the Khmer Rouge, into demented murderers. By this elaborate hypothesis American actions in 1969 and 1970 are held principally responsible for the genocide carried out by the Cambodian Communist rulers after we left in 1975-two years after all American military actions ceased-as well as for the suffering imposed by the North Vietnamese invasion of 1978.”

“On March 18, 1970, the neutralist chief of state Norodom Sihanouk was deposed by his own government and national assembly. The reason was Cambodian popular outrage at the continued presence of the North Vietnamese occupiers, and Sihanouk’s inability to get them to leave. When Cambodia’s new leadership demanded the departure of the North Vietnamese , the latter responded by a wave of attacks all over eastern Cambodia designed to topple the new government in Phnom Penh- a month before the U.S.-South Vietnamese “incursion” into the sanctuaries, which lasted eight weeks. It was Hanoi that had spurned our proposal to immediately restore Cambodia’s neutrality, which I made to Le Doc Tho in a secret meeting on April 4, 1970.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 336

Kissinger did not directly address whether the United States, also frustrated by Sihanouk’s inability to deal with the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, had a hand in the Lon Nol coup that deposed Sihanouk. That action, whether encouraged or not, was not the right prescription for Cambodia, and brought what had to be the anticipated military backlash from Hanoi. Kissinger is correct on the facts as he outlines them above, but they are not the only facts to be considered. The U.S. errors in Indochina are too numerous to list here, and Nixon/Kissinger inherited the war, but the American groupthink mindset, and failure to grasp nuance, and the evolving relationship between the North Vietnamese and China, led in some respects to the vast debacle of Cambodia. That viewpoint cannot excuse the cynical and ruthless exploitation of Cambodia by the North Vietnamese.

Kissinger gives us a view of the Chinese perspective of the evolving Cambodian situation, and in so doing makes a stark admission. As China carefully walked the diplomatic tightrope in advance of the ultimate Khmer Rouge victory they gave subtle clues that they were open to something less than a full victory for the communist insurgency. Of course this was due to the Chinese aversion to North Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Kissinger acknowledged that a true master of diplomacy, Zhou Enlai, had left the diplomatic clues of potential convergence of Chinese and American interests in Cambodia, but that the American side (read him) had failed to appreciate or understand those clues, which were couched in denunciations of U.S. actions.

“Zhou Enlai tried to cut through these perplexities-at first a bit too obliquely for us to grasp.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 349

The story did not end well for Cambodia, and eventually for Zhou as well. Kissinger believes, likely correctly, that the Zhou diplomatic play, which ended up not working for either the U.S. or China, was the ultimate cause of the downfall of Premier Zhou Enlai in China. Kissinger blamed the inability of the U.S. to hold up its end of the bargain, by maintaining military pressure on the Khmer Rouge, for the ultimate failure. This he attributed to Congressional action prohibiting financial support for this pressure.

China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. Enough to fill the plate of any diplomat. Kissinger was dealing with the opening to China, detente and arms control with the Soviet Union, a very tenuous relationship with our European allies, “The Year of Europe” initiative, the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile (for which he is vilified strenuously today) and of course a major part of the book, the advent of the Yom Kippur War, and Kissinger’s monumental shuttle efforts that brought disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, as well as Israel and Syria. Kissinger’s efforts on this issue alone were herculean, and to this day held up as the gold standard in diplomacy. Kissinger’s goals here not only included reaching these stage one disengagements but through them the vast diminishment of Soviet influence in the Middle East. As the Middle East suffers through another breakout of war today and some strains begin to show between U.S. and Israeli viewpoints on what the proper actions should be Kissinger’s experiences dealing with the Israeli leadership are instructive, and show that there has always been a bit of strain at points between the countries. A great additional source of information on this issue is the Martin Indyk book “Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy” which also gives us a great vantage point on the true extent of Kissinger’s achievements here.

Kissinger, in all his writings, always left observations that are worth repeating. This book has more than a few:

“One of the arts of diplomacy is to clothe a rejection in the form of an acceptance in principle.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 843-844

“The political dilemma of democracy is that the time span needed for solutions to contemporary economic problems is far longer than the than the electoral cycle by which leaders performance is judged at the polls. ……The way is open for demagoguery, political polarization and violence.”

Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 886

I offer one last tidbit that displays Kissinger’s rather wry sense of humor, and actually got a laugh from me as I read it. As mentioned above Kissinger, in his Middle East dealings, sought to remove Soviet influence from the region. This effort was not made via a frontal diplomatic assault on the Soviets, but rather through a diplomatic dance that appeared to offer U.S. partnership with the Soviets to achieve a settlement between the parties (the Soviets were the major arms suppliers to Egypt and Syria, and considered to be their diplomatic patrons.) With the Soviets getting a bit uncomfortable with the Kissinger maneuvering and not at all happy at being marginalized through the process Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a visit to discuss these matters with President Nixon. Kissinger’s description:

“The Oval Office meeting was made to order for Nixon’s skills at obfuscation; he was a master of the philosophical explanation that explained nothing but created the impression that he was sharing a confidence with his interlocutor. So Nixon blithely expressed his satisfaction with the diplomatic progress that had been made. The United States had been active because the parties wanted it that way. There was no record that we had discouraged this development, but that did not keep Nixon from avowing his general preference for cooperative endeavors with the USSR. On the other hand, the concrete circumstances differed for each superpower: ‘Some areas we can get into where you can’t. We must consider this.’ In other words Nixon favored superpower cooperation in the Middle East except where it did not serve his purpose. Where and how to work jointly, mused Nixon, was a tactical problem to be solved by Gromyko and me-thus neatly getting himself out of the line of fire. All this was presented in Nixon’s best country-boy manner, as if there had been some terrible misunderstanding about a subject too trivial for him to focus on.”


Kissinger, Henry “Years of Upheaval” pg. 942

Kissinger was a major figure in U.S. diplomatic history, and this second volume of his memoirs, for those interested in history, is well worth the long read. The career of Henry Kissinger provides us with a critical view, for better or worse, of some policy decisions still impacting us to this very day. On to volume 3.






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A Look at “President Garfield: From Radical to Unifier”

Posted on November 24, 2023 by billmanzi

President Garfield: From Radical to Unifier by C.W. Goodyear

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


C.W. Goodyear has given us an insightful look at James A. Garfield, the twentieth President of the United States. Garfield is a President that I had no real knowledge of, which I suspect may be true for many. His Presidency was cut short by an assassins bullet but his career, and importance, entailed so much more than his short Presidency.

James Garfield was born into poverty, the last President born in a log cabin. He raised himself, through hard work and an innate intelligence, to great heights even before he entered politics. He became a teacher, a College President, a Union general in the Civil War, and finally a Representative in the U.S. House at a time of severe divisions in the country. From my perspective the book really shines during the House of Representatives tenure of Garfield. Reconstruction of the defeated Confederacy was underway, and the attacks on the attempts to create rights and real citizenship for the black citizens of the South were well underway. Garfield was present in the House through this turbulence, and he was counted amongst those looking to grant real rights to southern blacks. He was absent from the House when it impeached President Andrew Johnson but came to have sympathy for that effort. The politics of the era were not limited to Reconstruction, and the author gives us a great view of those politics, and the political maneuverings of some of the giants of the era.

Those giants included U.S. Grant, who most certainly comes away from this effort somewhat diminished. James G. Blaine and Roscoe Conkling play major roles, as does Chester A. Arthur, who became Garfield’s Vice President. Garfield was a political conciliator by disposition and understanding, never looking to achieve political ends which he thought unattainable or that would cause political wreckage even if achieved.

“‘It is the business of statesmanship to wield the political forces so as not to destroy the end to be gained,’ Garfield told a friend.”

“President Garfield: From Radical to Unifier” C.W. Goodyear, pg. 325

Garfield’s road to the Presidency was quite fascinating, with the political backdrop provided by the book making it a truly unique and fascinating story. He was nominated at a Republican convention that he entered not as a candidate, but as a supporter of another candidacy. After 36 ballots of deadlock, and with U.S. Grant one of the candidates, looking to reclaim the Presidency, Garfield was turned to as the “compromise candidate.” In securing the nomination Garfield managed to out-maneuver both Conkling (a Grant supporter) and Blaine. His nature as a conciliator continued after he won the presidency, as he looked to bridge the very large divisions within his own party. Many of the divisions were attributable to patronage, and control of some very lucrative job plums. Conkling desired to have his control of the Port of New York restored, and though Garfield made real attempts to conciliate with Conkling his naming of William Robertson to that post set Conkling into a rage. Garfield’s earlier designation of many Conkling allies to scores of New York jobs failed to placate Conkling, and the fight was on.
Garfield’s desire for harmony through compromise was put to the test, as Conkling thought he could roll the new President on the issue. But Garfield had a tough side as well, and he drew the line on Conkling right here. Conkling was destroyed politically by Garfield, and some of that was due to his own overreach, but Garfield’s tenacity, and willingness to dig in and fight, carried the day. Garfield could only be pushed so far.

Garfield’s assassination, at the hands of a disgruntled job seeker, was a true tragedy, as the nation had suffered through the Lincoln assassination only sixteen years earlier. The shoddy and unsanitary treatment given to Garfield sealed his fate, likely as fatal to him as the gunshot wound suffered. We will never know what type of success he might have had as President as his tenure was so short but it is fair to say that the nation would have benefitted greatly had he been able to serve his full term.

I count this book as one of my favorites of 2023 and would highly recommend it.







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The Seabrook Emergency Operations Plan 2023

Posted on October 3, 2023 by billmanzi

The Town of Seabrook has completed, and the Board of Selectmen approved, the 2023 Emergency Operations Plan. This plan is updated every five years and follows our 2018 update. My thanks to Emergency Management Director Joseph Titone, Emergency Management Secretary Kelly McDonald, and Fire Chief William Edwards for all of their work on this project. The plan is attached below.

EOP_PublicReleaseVersion_Seabrook2023 FinalDownload
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A Look at Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962

Posted on September 3, 2023 by billmanzi

Nixon Volume 1: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962 by Stephen E. Ambrose

My rating: 4 of 5 stars


Stephen Ambrose has given us a three volume biography of Richard M. Nixon, the 37th President of the United States, and the first President to resign from office. This was the first of the three volumes. The book goes back to 1987 and so necessarily misses much information that has come out since then. This first volume is likely less impacted by that issue.

Richard Nixon most certainly has to be one of the most psychoanalyzed of American Presidents. For such a successful politician he would not be considered to be comfortable around people, and some of his personal traits would become the subject of so much writing and discussion. On that basis alone the part of the book dealing with his upbringing and development is more important, and more interesting, than the typical biography.

The Nixon that developed into a U.S. Representative, and Senator, is covered, and it is safe to say that Nixon became a national figure through those campaigns. He began to draw not only attention, but the enmity of Democrats nationwide for how he campaigned. Those campaigns alone could, and have, filled books. As Nixon became a national figure the Republican Party faced some of the same fissures that are being debated in that party today. Nixon was always interested primarily in foreign policy and over the course of his career came to be known as a GOP expert on the world. After WWII the GOP isolationist wing, as it had before the war, started to become predominant in the party. One of the first flash points in the GOP debate was over the Marshall Plan, and support of the Truman desire to send aid to Greece and Turkey as the British retrenched. Nixon received a letter opposing the Marshall Plan from a group of original supporters, but he determined, on his own, to support the Plan. Nixon the internationalist was born.

“These were not just the voices of California reactionaries; the Republican Party as a whole was having trouble swallowing the Marshall Plan. Senator Taft proclaimed that American money should not be poured into a ‘European TVA.’ Like many Republicans, Taft was disturbed at postwar steps in Western Europe to achieve democratic socialism, and he feared that the Europeans would use Marshall Plan money to nationalize basic industries, including American-owned plants. But despite the pressure from his constituents and from his party leaders, Nixon made up his own mind on the basis of what he saw, and learned, showed that he could free himself from Republican dogma, and then, to top it off, convinced his constituents that he was right.”

Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 155

The book presents us with some fascinating material, with some real historical perspective added to key parts of U.S. history. The Domino theory in Indochina? Nixon was propagating it in 1954. His role, from the inside as Vice-President, and from the outside after his defeat in the 1960 Presidential election, was so very impactful on U.S. policy, as he always advocated a tougher line against the North Vietnamese. Both Kennedy, and more importantly LBJ, were impacted by Nixon, and the harder edge of the GOP, in formulating policy in Vietnam. The “who lost China” theme always was useful politically and he used it ruthlessly.

“ ‘To sum it up bluntly,’ he declared, ‘the Acheson policy was directly responsible for the loss of China. And if China had not been lost, there would have been no war in Korea and there would be no war in Indochina today.’”

Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 349

Nixon was clearly wrong on this matter but the politics of it were more important to him. And in fairness at that time it was just not clear that this idea was wrong.

Nixon’s interactions, and political balancing of, the Joseph McCarthy issue is covered, and it shows Nixon as handling the issue adroitly as far as the politics went, but of course such political handling avoided condemnation of the indefensible. Even Ike, who detested much of what Joe McCarthy said and did, walked a fine line.

Nixon, as the Vice President under Ike, was a loyal servant to the President. He did not always agree with Ike, and in his memoirs spoke forcefully against the Eisenhower action to force France, Britain, and Israel to abandon their seizure of the Suez Canal. (He supported the President at the time) We get to look at the events leading up to the “Checkers speech” Nixon gave that saved his spot on the 1952 Republican ticket, which likely saved his career.

There is plenty to look at through Nixon’s 8 years as Ike’s VP. Nixon’s credentials as an ardent anti-communist were burnished during this tenure despite Ike. In light of later developments his position on “Red China” was fascinating. With an absence from an upcoming NSC meeting coming Nixon sent a memo on the China issue so that his views would be known.

“I wish to have my view put on the record as follows: I am unequivocally opposed at this time to recognition of Red China, admission of Red China to the United Nations and to any concept of ‘two Chinas’”.

Ambrose, Stephen Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 pg. 460

Nixon’s “kitchen debate” with Khrushchev garnered him much publicity, and of course made him a champion of the anti-communist right. Nixon’s very hard anti-communism always gave him a bit of leeway domestically, which he would exploit carefully. Nobody could accuse Nixon of being “soft” if he made a domestic concession or two. His anti-communist bona fides were just too strong.

The book, of course, gives us a look at one of the most fascinating Presidential elections in history, the Nixon-JFK match of 1960. Great look at how that campaign took shape, and how Nixon was out-maneuvered by the Kennedy campaign on the issue of national security. (The Missile Gap) Nixon never forgot that lesson, and that campaign hardened him more than a little bit. (If that was possible.) Ambrose takes this book through the Nixon campaign for Governor of California. That campaign loss, to Edmund (Pat) Brown, the father of Jerry Brown, brought Nixon to the nadir of his political career. A two-time loser after his loss to JFK in 1960 Nixon was written off as politically dead by many. His press conference after that loss (you won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore) gave credence to the idea he was finished. We know that his political story did not end there, but that is where this first volume comes to a close.

Ambrose, admittedly, was not a Nixon fan, but he takes great pains to be even-handed in his approach. He offers both criticism and praise, and I do believe the book is fair.

A final note on this is that we see some of the very important people that would later be associated with Nixon start to appear. Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and even Judge John Sirica make appearances in the book.

There is a lot of scholarship on Nixon, and though dated I do believe that the Ambrose book is well worth the read. Nixon remains one of the most polarizing of U.S. Presidents, and one of the true giants of American politics. Understanding his life, times, and politics, I believe, will help us to understand some of the many issues facing the country today.






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The Political Career of Richard M. Nixon

Posted on September 2, 2023 by billmanzi

As i continue to be drawn to books about the Administration of Richard Nixon, the 37th President of the United States I thought he might be a good subject for a blog post independent of the books. The sheer volume of the writing is staggering and brings to us the fact that Nixon was much more than the great political villain some easy history paints him as today. Some of the books that I have read, with some reviewed, are:

  1. Master of the Game (Kissinger’s Middle East Diplomacy.)
  2. Three Days at Camp David (Nixon’s move to take the dollar off the gold standard)
  3. The Nixon Defense (John Dean on Watergate)
  4. Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (The Nixon opening to China)
  5. The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (Part of Rick Perlstein’s great multi-book series on the rise of the right)
  6. White House Years (The first of the three volumes of Kissinger’s Memoirs)
  7. The Making of the President 1960 (Teddy White’s first run at a campaign book. It set the standard for much that followed.)
  8. Nixonland The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. (Another from Perlstein)
  9. American Maelstrom The 1968 Election and the Politics of Division (Superb effort by Michael Cohen)
  10. All The Presidents Men (Woodward Bernstein)
  11. The Last Days (Woodward Bernstein)
  12. Nixon The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 (Part 1 of 3 from Steve Ambrose)

Nixon’s presidential administration has, without question, left plenty to write about., as has his full career. Much of that legacy is tarnished, and not only by Watergate. A fair look at the totality of the record shows us that whatever your view of Nixon he ranks as one of the largest American figures of the 20th century. LBJ has had a similar volume of material written, and stands with Nixon as one of the most impactful Americans of the 20th century. (We eagerly await the final volume on LBJ from Robert Caro, but I digress.)

An amazing Nixon fact is that he was on every national Republican ticket, except for 1964, for 20 years. (1952, 1956, 1960, 1968, and 1972) In 1964, despite not being on the ticket, he was still a major player in the process. A dominant player in the GOP, and nationally. Hard to see anyone ever replicating that.

Nixon was also a U.S. Congressman and Senator, and from those perches managed to have an outsized impact on U.S. foreign policy. This influence was both partisan and influential, as Democratic Administrations (Truman, Kennedy, LBJ) always had to be mindful of Nixon’s attacks from the right. He managed to get these folks looking over their shoulders, concerned about the potential criticism. (Who lost China?) In my view it is one of the most important aspects of Nixon’s career. Even out of office he had some measure of influence and an ability to get Democratic Presidents unnerved.

Nixon, of course, is very much linked to Watergate. As time marches on and memories fade he likely will be known more for that than anything. His actions with regard to Watergate were an abomination, for the country, and for Nixon personally. Despite that legacy he managed to partially rehabilitate himself in the years after his resignation, There have been some recent news stories about newly released correspondence from President Nixon to then President Bill Clinton. A link to the WSJ story is below. Nixon, at 81, provided to Clinton some sage advice, and though the story was just getting started, some incredibly prescient observations/advice on Russia, and Ukraine.

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

“The Ukraine War Would Not Have Surprised Richard Nixon” Luke A. Nichter Wall Street Journal July 21, 2023

Bill Clinton, in giving the eulogy at the Nixon funeral, said that Nixon needed to be judged for the totality of his career, and not just on one part of it. While the totality, besides Watergate, was not always positive there were indeed some remarkable moments and achievements.

The books by Perlstein referenced above, and the American Maelstrom book by Cohen, are not kind to Nixon. They do show what a major impact his career had on American politics, and how that influence is still felt today.

Nixon was never considered to be a man with a great sense of humor, but even he got into the Rowan & Martin Laugh In craze that swept the country during his second campaign for the Presidency in 1968. His brief but memorable appearance on Laugh In was a big success for him. I think he delivered the line perfectly. His letter to President Clinton, referenced above, is below. The Clinton eulogy for Nixon is below. More on Nixon to come.

The Wall Street Journal Article is linked here.

nixonletterDownload
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The Seabrook 2024 CIP

Posted on August 13, 2023 by billmanzi

I have presented the 2024 Seabrook Capital Improvement Plan to the Board of Selectmen as well as the Planning Board. The CIP document is one of critical importance in every community. With aging wastewater infrastructure and the need to identify new water sources it is especially important for Seabrook in 2024.

Seabrook 2024 CIP FinalDownload

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A Look at “Recoding America: Why Government is Failing in the Digital Age and How We Can Do Better”

Posted on July 29, 2023 by billmanzi

Recoding America: Why Government Is Failing in the Digital Age and How We Can Do Better by Jennifer Pahlka

My rating: 5 of 5 stars


I have been intrigued by recent writing (and podcasting) by Ezra Klein on the lack of effectiveness in government, and how we “need a liberalism that builds.” In reading and listening to Klein I was struck by how powerful his arguments were, and how much of his writing on the subject was and is recognizable. I wrote a blog piece on it, and Klein has resumed this conversation through his New York Times column. In listening to the Klein podcast I listened to Klein interview Jennifer Pahlka, the author of a new book “[Re] Coding America.” Klein described the book as one that he hoped that “all policymakers would read.” He hooked me, and after reading it I agree. This is a book that policy makers should read.

Pahlka has served as the Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the United States, and is the founder of Code for America, a non-profit that assists government in formulating workable technology solutions.

Pahlka, in writing this book, really does not pull many punches. She gives us examples of notable government technology failures, and talks about, in great specificity, why these failures occurred. In identifying the failures and why these failures occurred Pahlka, in my view, manages to get well beyond technology issues to fundamental issues of management, and how we make policy. While this book is centered on technology the management lessons imparted extend well beyond technology issues. I do believe that the obvious connection Klein makes to his policy complaints from the “We Need a Liberalism That Builds” series of writings and podcasts are indeed reflected in this book. And they are unquestionably valid.

The book is not a long one, but there is just so much to unpack. We get a view of some pretty notable tech failures in government (including the health care.gov debacle) that examine the failure, and the root causes of the failure. These root causes are not because of faulty code, or due to projects being under-resourced. Pahlka identifies systemic incentives that have ground level policy implementers more concerned with checking off boxes dictated by by the policy at hand, and protecting themselves against oversight, and potential project failure that someone above them may attribute to implementation that deviated from policy. And that oversight can be extensive, as Pahlka points out.

“But it’s already common for government technology teams to report to six, seven, eight, or even more separate oversight bodies, and that’s before they get flagged for an investigation by an agency inspector general, audited by the Government Accountability Office, or called before a congressional committee (or the state or local equivalent of any of these). There are obvious harms from this excess: it worsens an already debilitatingly risk aversion, and when these bodies issue conflicting guidance it creates confusion and derails progress. But the bigger problem is that all the oversight hijacks the time and attention the teams supposedly delivering the product or service. When all your time is spent answering questions and writing reports for other people inside government, it’s mighty hard to be focused on the people outside government you’re supposed to serve.”

Jennifer Pahlka “[Re] Coding America.” Pg. 14

An important point but one that flows into a more critical one, which is the total disconnect between those creating policy, and the folks on the ground trying to implement said policy. That disconnect is shown to us through several painful specifics.

We get a look at the overloaded California unemployment benefits agency, whose software staggered and crashed under the load of filings during the pandemic. Whenever I would see a story like that I always assumed that the underlying technology was likely ok, but that the system was simply over-capacity. Wrong again. Pahlka describes what they found under the hood, which was a system that had been appended to multiple times, and in multiple ways, building on top of technology that dates back to the 1980’s that was using COBOL. The system was so disjointed, with these separate pieces handling different tasks, (and sometimes the same tasks) that the team brought in to ascertain the backlog of cases took seven full weeks just to count that number. This was not employee incompetence, or even the IT staff being incompetent. It was operating a legacy system that had continually been patched with updates that built on obsolete technology that simply could not meet the needs of the citizens it was supposed to be helping.

Well then why not exit the existing system and start from scratch? Pahlka gives us the simply unbelievable cases of where we have set out to do that.

1. The California update of the court system software to connect the courts with a document management system. Cost $500 million. Result: Scrapped.
2. A 2009 launch of new software by the U.S. State Department to upgrade software for visas, passport renewals, and other services. Estimated launch 2016. Cost: Original estimate of $18 million. Real cost: Indeterminate, with estimates between $200-600 million. Launch? Limited pilot of one component in 2019 in six locations worldwide. As of 2021 that pilot program had not been expanded.
3. IRS project to replace the key “Individual Master File” launched in 2000, with completion scheduled for 2006. By 2009 project $37 million over budget, with no result. Project: Scrapped. New replacement project launched, scheduled completion by 2014. In 2019 that project was declared too broad by the IRS, and modified to retire only parts of the old system. In 2021 the IRS has said anticipated completion of the new project is 2030.

Why does this occur? Is it lack of technology chops in government service? Pahlka points out that many of the mega projects have been outsourced to companies with plenty of technology talent, but the results have been, in many instances, the same. Plenty of money spent, but no real results. Nicholas Bagley, in an Atlantic story on this book, summed it up accurately (and better than I could)

“Pahlka brings to vivid life how a cover-your-butt culture that prizes legalistic compliance above all else is especially pernicious for government tech. Policy makers layer requirement upon requirement without considering whether the benefits of complexity outweigh the costs. Even when policy makers give agencies some flexibility, the bureaucracy often transforms suggestions into rigid requirements, which are then slavishly followed. The public interest gets forgotten along the way.
In other words, Pahlka’s book isn’t just about tech. It’s about the American administrative state, and it’s a call for paring back the rigid rules that make it so hard to govern, and for rebuilding government’s ability to do its job effectively.”

Nicholas Bagley How to Fix the Government The Atlantic June 12, 2023

Creating top down specifications for new software that include what browsers need to be accommodated, and other layers of rules that are meant to meet needs but simply hamper the development of technology that actually helps people, is a recipe for failure. And once these conditions are placed the bureaucracy, in so many cases just fearful of not checking all the boxes, carries them out even to the detriment of the ultimate usability of the software.

As Bagley points out Pahlka’s book is nominally about government and technology, but in reality it is about so much more. Policy makers really should read this book. It not only will open your eyes but gives concrete, and achievable, ways to defeat this problem. If you have time catch the Ezra Klein podcast with her as the guest. Worth a listen.

The Ezra Klein Podcast with Jennifer Pahlka

Nicholas Bagley The Procedure Fetish






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A Look at “The Ghost at the Feast” by Robert Kagan

Posted on June 17, 2023 by billmanzi

The Ghost at the Feast: America and the Collapse of World Order, 1900-1941 by Robert Kagan

My rating: 5 of 5 stars


Author Robert Kagan has given us an extraordinary book that looks at U.S. foreign policy from 1898 to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This book does not simply offer broad strokes but gets into the key aspects of decision making during this period.

Kagan is a State Department veteran and the author of “Dangerous Nation” which I have not read. This book follows “Dangerous Nation as the second in a trilogy. Some have classified him as a “neo-con” but at this point maybe those attempts to file individuals into defined categories is not as useful as it might have been once.

The United States of the early 20th century was indeed developing into an economic colossus but without the desire to play a large role in international affairs. The country, and its leaders, expressed a high level of disdain and distrust for such affairs, and were very reluctant to get intertwined in the rivalries and great power maneuvering of Europe. Kagan takes us through this period, leading up to the U.S. entry into World War I, with great detail. We get a real view of public opinion, and the political currents running through this question in the U.S. That opinion, right up until the U.S. entry into the War, always had a sizable segment favoring no involvement. The book is worth reading just for the detailed description of the tortured road Woodrow Wilson took from neutrality to American entry into WW I, and how some key public opinion changed over the course of the first three years of the war. Was there something more at stake than anger over German actions?

“Walter Lippmann spelled out these broader interests in the New Republic in the weeks following Germany’s January 30 announcement. He argued that the United States had an interest not in legalisms about neutral rights but in the preservation of an ‘Atlantic Community’ made up of the western and mostly democratic nations on both sides of the ocean. It had an interest in seeing to it that ‘the world’s highway’ should not be closed either to Americans or the Western Allies. It had an interest in defending ‘the civilization of which we are a part’ against the ‘anarchy’ that would result from a German victory. Germany was fighting for ‘a victory subversive of the world system in which America lives.’”

Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 190

Lippmann articulated a concept that after World War II became a defining principle of U.S. foreign policy. But those that saw a larger U.S. interest in establishing and maintaining an international system based on common “western” values were to be disappointed at the end of the First World War. Wilson failed to bring the country along to this ideal, and despite the victory over Germany the U.S. simply receded, diplomatically, to its pre-war mindset of little or no involvement after the war. Kagan shows us the disaster that entailed, for the world, and for the United States.

“It is the contention of this book that the United States had it within its power to preserve the peace in Europe after 1919, and at a manageable cost. But for reasons having little to do with capacity , Washington policymakers would not take the steps necessary. And while it is customary to focus on the collapse of world order in the 1930s it was in the 1920s that the peace was truly lost. By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, Hitler was already in power in Germany, and the self described “have-not” powers, which included Italy and Japan along with Germany, had already embarked on their determined attempt to undo the fragile order that Americans were half-heartedly attempting to establish.”

Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 220

Kagan lays out the thesis and then supports it with pretty difficult to argue with facts. With Europe in shambles from the war new diplomatic dynamics were being established, but as mentioned Washington was absent.

As Mark Twain said history doesn’t repeat itself but it does rhyme. As Woodrow Wilson fought for American participation in the League of Nations he was bitterly opposed by the national Republican Party.

“It was the party of Theodore Roosevelt who had asked Americans to ‘take a risk for internationalism.’ But in the process of opposing Wilson and the League, Lodge and his colleagues had radically shifted. The Republican Party became the party it would be for the next quarter century, the party that equated internationalism with Bolshevism, the party of ‘Americanism’ and insular nationalism, the party of rigid abstention from world politics, the party of William Borah. Republicans treated the League as if it were a European plot for world domination. They depicted France and Great Britain not as loyal allies who deserved American support but as greedy imperialists trying to bully and ensnare the United States in their wily scheme.”


Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 254

And so the short sighted American demand for full repayment of the war debts of Britain and France led to a circular firing squad, with these demands spurring continued allied demands on the defeated Germans for full reparation payments. And with no security structure in place in the absence of American involvement the financial, as well as the security fears of France and Germany, brought the world full circle.

“Americans on the scene-career diplomats, military officers, and political appointees alike-warned throughout the 1920s that the danger of another war was high, that American economic interests were threatened, and that absent a more active American diplomacy a ‘catastrophe’ loomed.”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 302

Kagan’s historical analysis is quite right, and the history is precise. Kagan, of course, is not looking solely at Europe. In much the same manner as in Europe the problems in Asia were beginning to boil over as well. After WW I there was a serious power vacuum in Asia, and the Japanese moved to fill it. The danger was seen, but the will to take the necessary steps, primarily a naval buildup that would allow the U.S. to restore some “equilibrium” in the Pacific, just was not there.

“The U.S. minister to China, Paul Reinsch, warned that if Japan were not contained, it would become ‘the greatest engine of military oppression and dominance’ that the world had ever seen and that a ‘huge armed conflict’ would be ‘absolutely inevitable.’”

Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 314

Kagan takes us on the road to the Second World War, and how, even with the provocations of Hitler, it was still a non-interventionist bent in American public opinion. One of the issues that has always been of interest to me has been what the world, and U.S. response, to the Nazi policies and actions against the German Jewish population had been. Kagan gives us a truly great chapter on the U.S. response to Kristallnacht, and how that vile pogrom, in 1938, impacted U.S. public opinion in a way that was detrimental to Germany. Another chapter that made this book so very interesting to me.

Kagan has a point of view, and spells it out clearly. Agree or not the book will stimulate thought and discussion, and hopefully move that discussion to a higher plane.

This book is a wonderful read for those interested in this subject matter. Kagan has a chapter in the new book “The New Makers of Modern Strategy” which I have not yet arrived at, but I am looking forward to it. Highly recommended.





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A Look at “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” by Paul Kennedy

Posted on June 3, 2023 by billmanzi

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 by Paul Kennedy

My rating: 5 of 5 stars


Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” is a monumental work of historical scholarship that meticulously examines the dynamics behind the ascent and decline of major global powers throughout history. Kennedy’s book is still considered a classic, and his scholarship continues to have relevance today. Originally published in 1987, Kennedy’s insights and analysis continue to resonate today, offering us lessons on the connection between the economic health and the military reach of the prominent empires of the past 500 years.

What is the theory? Kennedy sums it up in the introduction:

“It sounds crudely mercantilistic to express it this way but wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If however too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the same way, if a state overextends itself strategically-by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars-it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all-a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline.”

Kennedy, Paul The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers pg. xvi

Kennedy surveys the rise and fall of several great powers, including Spain, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to list a few. He traces their trajectories, exploring the complex factors that propelled their ascent and ultimately led to their decline. By examining multiple case studies, Kennedy constructs a comprehensive framework for understanding the recurrent patterns and common themes that characterize the rise and fall of great powers. The discussion can be technical, with economic tables spread throughout, but it is understandable.

Kennedy’s historical analysis is deeply rooted in economic factors. He emphasizes the critical role that economic strength plays in determining a nation’s ability to project power and sustain its position as a global leader. His examination of economic resources, technological advancements, and the management of finances sheds light on how economic imbalances can contribute to the decline of a power and create vulnerabilities that are exploited by rising powers. Kennedy’s analysis is concise, his conclusions difficult to refute.

Kennedy skillfully weaves political, military, and local factors into his narrative. He delves into the importance of military advancements, technological innovations, geopolitical strategies, and political institutions, in shaping the destiny of great powers. This multidimensional approach provides a nuanced understanding of the interplay between various elements and their impact on the rise and fall of nations.


“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” will not be for everyone, and could not be described as a page-turner. The book’s length and detailed analysis make it more of an academic exercise, but fascinating and illuminating for those interested. It stands as a seminal work that continues to shape our understanding of international relations and the dynamics of power. It is a true classic, and highly recommended.










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The Seabrook Memorial Day Service 2023

Posted on June 1, 2023 by billmanzi

The Seabrook Memorial Day Service and Parade was blessed with a wonderful day and great community participation. A big thank you to event organizer Cassandra Carter for all of her great work, the American Legion Post 70 for their participation, the Seabrook DPW for their work as well as the Seabrook Police Department for their work and assistance. Thanks to the Seabrook Board of Selectmen for their strong support and participation. Thanks to our legislative delegation as well!

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