I have presented the 2024 Seabrook Capital Improvement Plan to the Board of Selectmen as well as the Planning Board. The CIP document is one of critical importance in every community. With aging wastewater infrastructure and the need to identify new water sources it is especially important for Seabrook in 2024.
I have been intrigued by recent writing (and podcasting) by Ezra Klein on the lack of effectiveness in government, and how we “need a liberalism that builds.” In reading and listening to Klein I was struck by how powerful his arguments were, and how much of his writing on the subject was and is recognizable. I wrote a blog piece on it, and Klein has resumed this conversation through his New York Times column. In listening to the Klein podcast I listened to Klein interview Jennifer Pahlka, the author of a new book “[Re] Coding America.” Klein described the book as one that he hoped that “all policymakers would read.” He hooked me, and after reading it I agree. This is a book that policy makers should read.
Pahlka has served as the Deputy Chief Technology Officer of the United States, and is the founder of Code for America, a non-profit that assists government in formulating workable technology solutions.
Pahlka, in writing this book, really does not pull many punches. She gives us examples of notable government technology failures, and talks about, in great specificity, why these failures occurred. In identifying the failures and why these failures occurred Pahlka, in my view, manages to get well beyond technology issues to fundamental issues of management, and how we make policy. While this book is centered on technology the management lessons imparted extend well beyond technology issues. I do believe that the obvious connection Klein makes to his policy complaints from the “We Need a Liberalism That Builds” series of writings and podcasts are indeed reflected in this book. And they are unquestionably valid.
The book is not a long one, but there is just so much to unpack. We get a view of some pretty notable tech failures in government (including the health care.gov debacle) that examine the failure, and the root causes of the failure. These root causes are not because of faulty code, or due to projects being under-resourced. Pahlka identifies systemic incentives that have ground level policy implementers more concerned with checking off boxes dictated by by the policy at hand, and protecting themselves against oversight, and potential project failure that someone above them may attribute to implementation that deviated from policy. And that oversight can be extensive, as Pahlka points out.
“But it’s already common for government technology teams to report to six, seven, eight, or even more separate oversight bodies, and that’s before they get flagged for an investigation by an agency inspector general, audited by the Government Accountability Office, or called before a congressional committee (or the state or local equivalent of any of these). There are obvious harms from this excess: it worsens an already debilitatingly risk aversion, and when these bodies issue conflicting guidance it creates confusion and derails progress. But the bigger problem is that all the oversight hijacks the time and attention the teams supposedly delivering the product or service. When all your time is spent answering questions and writing reports for other people inside government, it’s mighty hard to be focused on the people outside government you’re supposed to serve.”
Jennifer Pahlka “[Re] Coding America.” Pg. 14
An important point but one that flows into a more critical one, which is the total disconnect between those creating policy, and the folks on the ground trying to implement said policy. That disconnect is shown to us through several painful specifics.
We get a look at the overloaded California unemployment benefits agency, whose software staggered and crashed under the load of filings during the pandemic. Whenever I would see a story like that I always assumed that the underlying technology was likely ok, but that the system was simply over-capacity. Wrong again. Pahlka describes what they found under the hood, which was a system that had been appended to multiple times, and in multiple ways, building on top of technology that dates back to the 1980’s that was using COBOL. The system was so disjointed, with these separate pieces handling different tasks, (and sometimes the same tasks) that the team brought in to ascertain the backlog of cases took seven full weeks just to count that number. This was not employee incompetence, or even the IT staff being incompetent. It was operating a legacy system that had continually been patched with updates that built on obsolete technology that simply could not meet the needs of the citizens it was supposed to be helping.
Well then why not exit the existing system and start from scratch? Pahlka gives us the simply unbelievable cases of where we have set out to do that.
1. The California update of the court system software to connect the courts with a document management system. Cost $500 million. Result: Scrapped. 2. A 2009 launch of new software by the U.S. State Department to upgrade software for visas, passport renewals, and other services. Estimated launch 2016. Cost: Original estimate of $18 million. Real cost: Indeterminate, with estimates between $200-600 million. Launch? Limited pilot of one component in 2019 in six locations worldwide. As of 2021 that pilot program had not been expanded. 3. IRS project to replace the key “Individual Master File” launched in 2000, with completion scheduled for 2006. By 2009 project $37 million over budget, with no result. Project: Scrapped. New replacement project launched, scheduled completion by 2014. In 2019 that project was declared too broad by the IRS, and modified to retire only parts of the old system. In 2021 the IRS has said anticipated completion of the new project is 2030.
Why does this occur? Is it lack of technology chops in government service? Pahlka points out that many of the mega projects have been outsourced to companies with plenty of technology talent, but the results have been, in many instances, the same. Plenty of money spent, but no real results. Nicholas Bagley, in an Atlantic story on this book, summed it up accurately (and better than I could)
“Pahlka brings to vivid life how a cover-your-butt culture that prizes legalistic compliance above all else is especially pernicious for government tech. Policy makers layer requirement upon requirement without considering whether the benefits of complexity outweigh the costs. Even when policy makers give agencies some flexibility, the bureaucracy often transforms suggestions into rigid requirements, which are then slavishly followed. The public interest gets forgotten along the way. In other words, Pahlka’s book isn’t just about tech. It’s about the American administrative state, and it’s a call for paring back the rigid rules that make it so hard to govern, and for rebuilding government’s ability to do its job effectively.”
Nicholas Bagley How to Fix the Government The Atlantic June 12, 2023
Creating top down specifications for new software that include what browsers need to be accommodated, and other layers of rules that are meant to meet needs but simply hamper the development of technology that actually helps people, is a recipe for failure. And once these conditions are placed the bureaucracy, in so many cases just fearful of not checking all the boxes, carries them out even to the detriment of the ultimate usability of the software.
As Bagley points out Pahlka’s book is nominally about government and technology, but in reality it is about so much more. Policy makers really should read this book. It not only will open your eyes but gives concrete, and achievable, ways to defeat this problem. If you have time catch the Ezra Klein podcast with her as the guest. Worth a listen.
Author Robert Kagan has given us an extraordinary book that looks at U.S. foreign policy from 1898 to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This book does not simply offer broad strokes but gets into the key aspects of decision making during this period.
Kagan is a State Department veteran and the author of “Dangerous Nation” which I have not read. This book follows “Dangerous Nation as the second in a trilogy. Some have classified him as a “neo-con” but at this point maybe those attempts to file individuals into defined categories is not as useful as it might have been once.
The United States of the early 20th century was indeed developing into an economic colossus but without the desire to play a large role in international affairs. The country, and its leaders, expressed a high level of disdain and distrust for such affairs, and were very reluctant to get intertwined in the rivalries and great power maneuvering of Europe. Kagan takes us through this period, leading up to the U.S. entry into World War I, with great detail. We get a real view of public opinion, and the political currents running through this question in the U.S. That opinion, right up until the U.S. entry into the War, always had a sizable segment favoring no involvement. The book is worth reading just for the detailed description of the tortured road Woodrow Wilson took from neutrality to American entry into WW I, and how some key public opinion changed over the course of the first three years of the war. Was there something more at stake than anger over German actions?
“Walter Lippmann spelled out these broader interests in the New Republic in the weeks following Germany’s January 30 announcement. He argued that the United States had an interest not in legalisms about neutral rights but in the preservation of an ‘Atlantic Community’ made up of the western and mostly democratic nations on both sides of the ocean. It had an interest in seeing to it that ‘the world’s highway’ should not be closed either to Americans or the Western Allies. It had an interest in defending ‘the civilization of which we are a part’ against the ‘anarchy’ that would result from a German victory. Germany was fighting for ‘a victory subversive of the world system in which America lives.’”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 190
Lippmann articulated a concept that after World War II became a defining principle of U.S. foreign policy. But those that saw a larger U.S. interest in establishing and maintaining an international system based on common “western” values were to be disappointed at the end of the First World War. Wilson failed to bring the country along to this ideal, and despite the victory over Germany the U.S. simply receded, diplomatically, to its pre-war mindset of little or no involvement after the war. Kagan shows us the disaster that entailed, for the world, and for the United States.
“It is the contention of this book that the United States had it within its power to preserve the peace in Europe after 1919, and at a manageable cost. But for reasons having little to do with capacity , Washington policymakers would not take the steps necessary. And while it is customary to focus on the collapse of world order in the 1930s it was in the 1920s that the peace was truly lost. By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, Hitler was already in power in Germany, and the self described “have-not” powers, which included Italy and Japan along with Germany, had already embarked on their determined attempt to undo the fragile order that Americans were half-heartedly attempting to establish.”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 220
Kagan lays out the thesis and then supports it with pretty difficult to argue with facts. With Europe in shambles from the war new diplomatic dynamics were being established, but as mentioned Washington was absent.
As Mark Twain said history doesn’t repeat itself but it does rhyme. As Woodrow Wilson fought for American participation in the League of Nations he was bitterly opposed by the national Republican Party.
“It was the party of Theodore Roosevelt who had asked Americans to ‘take a risk for internationalism.’ But in the process of opposing Wilson and the League, Lodge and his colleagues had radically shifted. The Republican Party became the party it would be for the next quarter century, the party that equated internationalism with Bolshevism, the party of ‘Americanism’ and insular nationalism, the party of rigid abstention from world politics, the party of William Borah. Republicans treated the League as if it were a European plot for world domination. They depicted France and Great Britain not as loyal allies who deserved American support but as greedy imperialists trying to bully and ensnare the United States in their wily scheme.”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 254
And so the short sighted American demand for full repayment of the war debts of Britain and France led to a circular firing squad, with these demands spurring continued allied demands on the defeated Germans for full reparation payments. And with no security structure in place in the absence of American involvement the financial, as well as the security fears of France and Germany, brought the world full circle.
“Americans on the scene-career diplomats, military officers, and political appointees alike-warned throughout the 1920s that the danger of another war was high, that American economic interests were threatened, and that absent a more active American diplomacy a ‘catastrophe’ loomed.” Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 302
Kagan’s historical analysis is quite right, and the history is precise. Kagan, of course, is not looking solely at Europe. In much the same manner as in Europe the problems in Asia were beginning to boil over as well. After WW I there was a serious power vacuum in Asia, and the Japanese moved to fill it. The danger was seen, but the will to take the necessary steps, primarily a naval buildup that would allow the U.S. to restore some “equilibrium” in the Pacific, just was not there.
“The U.S. minister to China, Paul Reinsch, warned that if Japan were not contained, it would become ‘the greatest engine of military oppression and dominance’ that the world had ever seen and that a ‘huge armed conflict’ would be ‘absolutely inevitable.’”
Kagan, Robert The Ghost at the Feast America and the Collapse of World Order 1900-1941 pg. 314
Kagan takes us on the road to the Second World War, and how, even with the provocations of Hitler, it was still a non-interventionist bent in American public opinion. One of the issues that has always been of interest to me has been what the world, and U.S. response, to the Nazi policies and actions against the German Jewish population had been. Kagan gives us a truly great chapter on the U.S. response to Kristallnacht, and how that vile pogrom, in 1938, impacted U.S. public opinion in a way that was detrimental to Germany. Another chapter that made this book so very interesting to me.
Kagan has a point of view, and spells it out clearly. Agree or not the book will stimulate thought and discussion, and hopefully move that discussion to a higher plane.
This book is a wonderful read for those interested in this subject matter. Kagan has a chapter in the new book “The New Makers of Modern Strategy” which I have not yet arrived at, but I am looking forward to it. Highly recommended.
Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” is a monumental work of historical scholarship that meticulously examines the dynamics behind the ascent and decline of major global powers throughout history. Kennedy’s book is still considered a classic, and his scholarship continues to have relevance today. Originally published in 1987, Kennedy’s insights and analysis continue to resonate today, offering us lessons on the connection between the economic health and the military reach of the prominent empires of the past 500 years.
What is the theory? Kennedy sums it up in the introduction:
“It sounds crudely mercantilistic to express it this way but wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. If however too large a proportion of the state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. In the same way, if a state overextends itself strategically-by, say, the conquest of extensive territories or the waging of costly wars-it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all-a dilemma which becomes acute if the nation concerned has entered a period of relative economic decline.”
Kennedy, Paul The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers pg. xvi
Kennedy surveys the rise and fall of several great powers, including Spain, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to list a few. He traces their trajectories, exploring the complex factors that propelled their ascent and ultimately led to their decline. By examining multiple case studies, Kennedy constructs a comprehensive framework for understanding the recurrent patterns and common themes that characterize the rise and fall of great powers. The discussion can be technical, with economic tables spread throughout, but it is understandable.
Kennedy’s historical analysis is deeply rooted in economic factors. He emphasizes the critical role that economic strength plays in determining a nation’s ability to project power and sustain its position as a global leader. His examination of economic resources, technological advancements, and the management of finances sheds light on how economic imbalances can contribute to the decline of a power and create vulnerabilities that are exploited by rising powers. Kennedy’s analysis is concise, his conclusions difficult to refute.
Kennedy skillfully weaves political, military, and local factors into his narrative. He delves into the importance of military advancements, technological innovations, geopolitical strategies, and political institutions, in shaping the destiny of great powers. This multidimensional approach provides a nuanced understanding of the interplay between various elements and their impact on the rise and fall of nations.
“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” will not be for everyone, and could not be described as a page-turner. The book’s length and detailed analysis make it more of an academic exercise, but fascinating and illuminating for those interested. It stands as a seminal work that continues to shape our understanding of international relations and the dynamics of power. It is a true classic, and highly recommended.
The Seabrook Memorial Day Service and Parade was blessed with a wonderful day and great community participation. A big thank you to event organizer Cassandra Carter for all of her great work, the American Legion Post 70 for their participation, the Seabrook DPW for their work as well as the Seabrook Police Department for their work and assistance. Thanks to the Seabrook Board of Selectmen for their strong support and participation. Thanks to our legislative delegation as well!
The Town of Seabrook, through its Board of Selectmen, have announced a three year tax agreement with NextEra. This tax agreement covers fiscal years 2021, 2022, and 2023 and is in the amount of $40 million for the three year period. This agreement is for the property occupied by the nuclear power facility Seabrook Station, which is owned by NextEra.
The tax agreement will settle the NextEra appeal of the FY 2021 tax assessment, which had been filed, as well as the 2022 tax assessment, which NextEra had filed a notice of intent to appeal. The agreement does not require Seabrook to refund, or abate, property tax for any one of the years covered in the agreement. The FY 2022 assessed value of the plant is $1.2 billion.
The prior three year tax agreement covered FY 2018, 2019, and 2020 and was valued at $36 million.
The statement issued after the announcement is below.
“This negotiation, although longer than usual, has produced an agreement that increases the three-year tax payment by $4 million, an outcome that is extremely positive for the taxpayers of Seabrook. It is, at the same time, an equitable agreement for NextEra and the Town. The Board of Selectmen are pleased with the result, and grateful for the diligence and work of the staff, and the partnership with NextEra that brought these negotiations to a successful conclusion.”
Robert E. Lee: A Life” is a remarkable biography by the historian and author Allen Guelzo. In this book, Guelzo provides a comprehensive and balanced portrait of one of the most famous and controversial figures in American history.
The book traces Lee’s life from his childhood in Virginia to his rise as a military commander during the American Civil War and his later years as a college president. Guelzo presents Lee as a complex figure, but does not at all run away from the inherent contradictions in Lee’s actions, and in Lee’s failures, as a human being and as a general.
Throughout the book, Guelzo provides a vivid and detailed account of the major events in Lee’s life, including his experiences in the Mexican-American War, his tenure as superintendent of West Point, and his role as commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. Lee was indeed the superintendent of West Point, and served with distinction in the U.S. Army in the Mexican campaign. Lee was an Army engineer who ended up becoming a renowned military strategist.
The decision of Lee to abandon the U.S. Army and go over to the rebellion is shown to be a pained one, an area I thought was covered excellently by the book. Lee managed, by expressing contradictory views on the key issues involved, to be thought of less harshly than many other Confederate leaders. Slavery? Lee expressed repugnance, and gave the view that slavery was not a sufficient reason for secession. But he was a slave owner, and became a leader of the rebellion. Lee’s tortured dance on the loyalty issue included declining Lincoln’s offer of command of the Union Army. The author offers some interesting speculation on Lee’s motivation being influenced by the fear of losing the Lee estate at Arlington, which likely would have been seized by the State of Virginia if Lee remained loyal to the Union. As it turned out Union forces immediately seized the estate upon Lee’s desertion. The federal government has held it since then, and it is now the national military cemetery.
His reputation as a brilliant field commander was earned, as he had some great success early in the war. Some of that success might be attributable, in part, to the less than stellar leadership of the Union generals lined up against him, but Lee absolutely deserves credit for devising the strategies that confounded and defeated the much more formidable Union forces at the beginning of the war. Although ultimately unsuccessful Lee’s thought that the disparity in resources would necessitate a Confederate northern incursion with the goal of melting northern political support for the war was really the only hope for the Confederacy. He wanted to hold on until the Union tired of the fight. Even Lee’s early success came at a heavy cost, as the Confederacy was not in a position to win battles that came with heavy losses in manpower and supply. Lee shall be forever linked in history to General Ulysses Grant, the Union General who recognized and acted on the wide disparity in manpower and resources that favored the Union. Once Grant was brought to the Eastern theatre Lee’s time was limited. Grant was simply uncontainable by the Confederate forces that Lee had available, and Grant was ruthless in his pursuit. After the war Lee may have come out ahead in terms of perceptions of military skill, but over the course of time Grant has been recognized for his great military skills as a General, and the comparisons to Lee have been much more favorable to Grant.
After the war Lee was pardoned for his treason by President Andrew Johnson, and is on record as being opposed to the glorification of Confederate generals, including being against statutes and monuments being erected in their honor.
One of the strengths of the book is it’s balanced and nuanced perspective on Lee’s character and actions. The author acknowledges Lee’s admirable qualities, including his leadership skills and his devotion to his troops, while also recognizing his flaws, most notably his support for slavery, and his treason. Overall, “Robert E. Lee: A Life” is a fascinating and insightful biography that sheds new light on one of the most iconic figures in American history. Guelzo’s extensive research and engaging writing style make this book a must-read for anyone interested in the Civil War era and the complex figures who shaped it.
“Grant” by Ron Chernow is a thoroughly researched and insightful biography of Ulysses S. Grant, one of the true giants of American history. The book does not shy away from some of the Grant failures, including his many unsuccessful attempts to find his way in business. Grant’s contribution to history was not in business, but rather as a dynamic military man whose leadership likely saved the Union. It took a bit of time, but when Lincoln finally turned to Grant the war with the Confederacy was not going well, and Grant turned that around. One of the book’s strengths is its ability to dispel many of the myths and misconceptions that have surrounded Grant for decades. Chernow portrays him as a complex and multifaceted figure, one who was both a brilliant military strategist and a flawed individual with a complicated personal life. Chernow does not shy away from the issue of Grant’s drinking, which comes up repeatedly. Without question Grant, despite many pledges, drank to excess on occasion. What is clear, at least to me, is that his drinking did not impair him or his military decision making at key moments. Lincoln reportedly said that if he knew what brand of whiskey Grant drank he would send a barrel of it to his other Generals. Lincoln had seen the results before Grant assumed command, and after his assumption of command of the Union armies. Lincoln preferred the results that Grant brought. Chernow’s book is not a detailed military history, but there is, by necessity, a good look at Grant the military man. After the Civil War was over the defeated Confederacy simply managed to do a better job of creating legends around their military leaders. (See Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson amongst many others) Lee, for many years, has received absolute veneration as a military genius. Grant, despite the record, for many years simply did not receive the credit he was due for his military prowess. This book is fair, but helps to correct that record. Grant started his Civil War career in the Western Theatre, and while the Army of the Potomac was performing dismally Grant was on the attack, winning key Union victories and catching the eye of President Lincoln. Grant absolutely had a resource advantage, and he pressed that advantage hard, putting relentless pressure on the Confederate armies he found in front of him. He was criticized for some of the high casualty counts in the battles he was involved in, but victory, even in the face of initial setbacks, always seemed to follow. (See Battle of Shiloh) Grant’s belief was that offensive operations were the key to victory. He never wavered from that view, even when under heavy criticism. When Lincoln made him the overall commander of Union forces he used the same tactics on Lee, driving forward, and chasing Lee’s Army across the map. Yes, he had greater resources than Lee, but so did General McClellan, who continually failed to win victories against Lee. Grant, in my view, simply out-generaled Robert Lee. Grant’s essential decency was shown in his relationship with Lincoln. Grant was a major figure before the Union victory, and Lincoln had to worry that Grant might be persuaded to run against him for the Presidency. But Lincoln soon realized that Grant had a loyalty to him, and that loyalty, and agreement on the Lincoln goals and objectives, precluded Grant from doing anything but supporting his President. Grant’s record on race was in sync with Lincoln, and his record in this area was strong. Grant rejected a prisoner exchange with the Confederacy where black union soldiers, under Confederate terms, would not be released if they had been slaves. In this and in his post-war record Grant, like Lincoln, sought to heal the wounds of the bitter divide. Grant’s record as President was a revelation to me. Some very interesting, and new to me, material on Grant. Grant’s trusting personality, so fatal to his business career, hurt him in the Presidency as well. But his record, once again, was not as abysmal as I had believed before the book. Chernow’s prose is lively and engaging, and he has a talent for bringing Grant’s contemporaries, like William Tecumseh Sherman, to life, and offers a detailed look at the social and political climate of the times. At over 1,000 pages, “Grant” is a substantial read, but Chernow’s storytelling skills keep the reader engaged throughout. He balances historical detail with compelling narrative, and the result is a biography that brings us a true giant of the United States. Grant, along with President Lincoln, saved the Union, and brought the Confederacy, and slavery with it, crashing down. Overall, “Grant” is a masterful work of historical biography, one that sheds new light on a complicated and often misunderstood figure in American history. Whether you are a fan of Civil War history or simply enjoy well-written biographies, this book is well worth your time.
Bill Manzi.com 