The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security by Bartholomew H. Sparrow
My rating: 4 of 5 stars
Brent Scowcroft had a long lasting and outsized role as a top figure in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, serving as national security advisor to Gerald Ford as well as George H.W. Bush. This book, on the long side, gives us a view of his life and contributions to U.S. foreign policy. Scowcroft may be the most important foreign policy figure of the last half century or so that many have never heard of. That is how Scowcroft worked, as an advisor that actually did stay in the background.
Brent Scowcroft was a military man (Air Force) and started assuming some vital positions in the Nixon Administration, where he became military assistant to the President, and was eventually tapped by Henry Kissinger to be Deputy National Security Advisor. As anyone familiar with Kissinger knows working for him could be considered a form of purgatory. As the Deputy and as a superb staff man Scowcroft impressed both Kissinger and Nixon, and his career as a key member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment began. Scowcroft was in charge of advance for the Nixon trip to Beijing and became the first U.S. military man to be in China since 1949. From this initial appointment Scowcroft was on hand for some major U.S. foreign policy achievements, such as the opening to China as well as the Nixon detente with the Soviets. He was also on hand for some U.S. foreign policy lows, including the incursion into Cambodia and the ultimate U.S. withdrawal under terrible circumstances from Vietnam.
Scowcroft, initially considered a Kissinger man, grew solidly into a figure with distinct views that were all his own. After the exit of Nixon and the ascension of Gerald Ford to the Presidency Ford determined to not allow Kissinger to be both security advisor and Secretary of State, forcing Kissinger out as security advisor. Scowcroft assumed that role, carving out his own area of influence. To replace Kissinger and then have to work with him as Secretary of State could not have been easy but Scowcroft managed the transition smoothly. It is a strength that Sparrow highlights continuously in the book, as Scowcroft showed a great ability to manage people and process. His rather large handprint on the National Security apparatus serving the President is still felt today. In that sense, as an organization man, he was superior to Kissinger, whose processes were more ego-centric and designed to meet Kissinger’s needs. Scowcroft sought to put together an apparatus that would manage to get the best information to the President, including information that may not have towed the President’s line.
Scowcroft, even while out of government, became an influential voice on foreign policy. After the Ford loss to Carter he worked at Kissinger Associates (and later formed his own consulting firm) but was consulted on a number of different issues. He showed a trait that would later become more pronounced, which was a willingness to speak (softly) against policies he did not agree with, regardless of the party of the President. He was very critical of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland that had discussed the possible elimination of the nuclear arsenals of both countries.
Scowcroft filled some important roles in the Reagan Administration, as Reagan turned to him to serve on commissions charged with arms control issues as well as on the Tower Commission that wrote a report on Iran-Contra.
With the presidency of George H.W. Bush Scowcroft once again assumed the role of national security advisor to the President. In that role and working with the strong willed James Baker as Secretary of State Scowcroft was involved heavily in managing the collapse of the U.S.S.R, the reunification of Germany, the first Gulf War, which not only succeeded militarily but diplomatically, as the Bush Administration managed to win massive worldwide support, including from the Soviets, for the military effort to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The policy that drove the first Gulf War, a limited military objective that eschewed regime change, would come back for debate in the administration of George W. Bush. The book critiques that decision, looking at the alternatives, along with the real human cost to the anti-Saddam elements in Iraq, who were eradicated by the left intact Saddam regime. In the end the Bush policy, despite not being perfect, was the correct call, in my opinion.
Scowcroft remained close for life with George H.W. Bush. (They wore a book together) That relationship did not stop Scowcroft from opposing the George W. Bush move to invade Iraq. His letter to the Wall Street Journal precipitated his temporary fall from grace with his former colleagues Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and his protege Condoleezza Rice. Many speculated that the Scowcroft letter was a way for George H.W. Bush to send a hard piece of advice to his son. I personally do not believe that but who really knows. Scowcroft ended up, of course, being shown to be correct on this issue.
In reading some of the reviews the book has been described as “laudatory” but I believe there is balance, as criticism is offered where the author thinks it warranted. Scowcroft was a major demo of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In addition to being a real mentor to Condi Rice he was also the man who brought Bob Gates along. This book, on a figure involved in some of the most impactful foreign policy decisions in U.S. history, is a bit long but a very worthwhile read.
https://www.youtube.com/embed/ctJpM4OlPBs?si=MtW9lnBmFZ_Bi6zN
A link to the Scowcroft letter to the WSJ on the potential Iraq invasion by George W. Bush
Bill Manzi.com 